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Foreword  
Raymond Hinnebusch 
This issue of the St. Andrews Papers by Samer Abboud and Salam Said 
focuses on Syrian trade and the increased integration of Syria’s 
economy into the global market, a development that parallels domestic 
economic reform. As a result of decades of statist ISI, Syria’s export 
capacity is weak and concentrated in hydrocarbons and to a lesser 
degree textiles and food products. With oil production declining, Syria 
must diversify its non-oil exports. Increased openness to foreign trade 
through trade agreements both challenges domestic producers and 
potentially expands the market for them. 
 This issue would profitably be read parallel to that on the EU-
Syrian relationship by Dostal and Zorob.1 That analysis showed the 
largely negative effects the European partnership agreement is likely to 
have on Syria and the few trading benefits it promises. The evidence 
presented by Abboud and Said largely reinforces this view. It will 
certainly much reduce Syria’s economic autonomy, long protected from 
the pressures of international financial institutions. In a worst-case 
scenario, it could lead to de-industrialization and even regime de-
stabilization. 
 Greater benefits are potentially to be had from more equitable 
bilateral agreements with Syria’s neighbours, including Turkey, and 
through the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). As a result of bi-
lateral agreements, Syria has already started to liberalize its foreign trade 
policy, exposing domestic producers to outside competition. Abboud 
and Said show that these regional initiatives have already produced 
benefits but also that their potential has not been fully exploited. Unlike 
the EU Partnership, these regional agreements provide domestic 
industries with opportunities as well as challenges, while preserving 
regime and social stability. Syria’s pursuit of the European Partnership 
Agreement seems inconsistent with the way, as Abboud argues that the 
Arab states have designed GAFTA, precisely to preserve governing 
coalitions. It may have been driven by foreign policy considerations 
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detached from adequate consideration of its political economy 
consequences. 
                                                
1 Jörg Michael Dostal and Anja Zorob, Syria and the Euro-Mediterranean 
Relationship, St Andrews Papers on Contemporary Syria, (distributed by Lynne 
Rienner Publishers), 2009. 
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1 
Syrian Trade Policy 
Samer Abboud 
Introduction 
Trade policy in Syria focuses on resolving the immediate crises facing 
the domestic economy: dependence on the trade and revenues of oil 
production and the economy’s relative dislocation from the regional 
division of labour. In addition, increasing prices, rising inflation, 
stagnant decreasing wages, decreases in living standards, unemployment 
and a poorly monetized financial system all contribute to aggravating 
these structural characteristics. These challenges confirm Karshenas’ 
(2001: 60) argument that one of the key issues for Arab countries in the 
post-oil boom period is to develop alternative sources of foreign 
exchange revenues by improving industrial competitiveness and 
diversifying their export bases. In this context, Syrian trade policy is 
defined by four goals: 1) alleviating the country’s dependence on oil 
exports and revenues; 2) providing domestic employment opportunities 
and achieving growth levels that can support population growth levels; 
3) providing a dependable foreign exchange revenue stream; and 4) 
expanding the productive sectors of the economy. 
The strategies to achieve these goals have included the negotiation 
of a series of bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements, beginning 
in the mid to late 1990s. This has also entailed a series of domestic 
policy shifts to prepare the Syrian public and private sectors for 
deepening regional integration. Trade policy thus aims at expanding 
market opportunities for Syrian production while simultaneously 
reorienting production towards regional as well as domestic markets. 
Within Syria’s broader shifts towards a marketized economy (see 
Abboud 2009) therefore lies a transition towards an internationalized 
economy.  
The aim of this essay is to broadly outline the contours and 
architecture of these bilateral and multilateral agreements and, in doing 
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so, to highlight the policy shifts generated by Syria’s ascension to these 
trading regimes. The primary emphasis will be on evaluating two 
multilateral agreements – the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) 
and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) – and the related policy 
shifts generated by both agreements. It will be argued that the GAFTA 
reflects Syria’s immediate trade capacities and thus has the most 
potential to generate positive trade outcomes. However, the GAFTA is 
not without its major faults. It is a regime based on the Open 
Regionalism model of trade that emphasizes cooperation over 
integration. The failure to establish Rules of Origin standards, the lack 
of dispute mechanisms, and the absence of any meaningful 
institutionalization, and thus regional oversight, of the GAFTA indicates 
that the model will generate little, if any, functional integration between 
Arab countries. While the EMP will not serve to immediately generate 
positive trade outcomes for Syrian exporters, and indeed may have 
increasingly negative short-term effects as Syrian producers compete on 
local markets with European goods, it may act as a policy anchor that 
demands of Syrian planners the implementation of policies that are 
consistent with the global trading regime.  
To advance this argument, this essay will begin with an overview of 
Syria’s existing trade patterns, trade policy directions and trade 
liberalization goals. Following this section, the EMP and GAFTA 
agreements will be evaluated, with particular attention to how both 
agreements can be understood within the context of Syria’s existing 
production capacities and trade patterns. Here, the essay is mainly 
concerned with considering how the EMP and GAFTA will shape 
Syrian trade policy, and what impacts these policy shifts will have on 
Syria’s domestic political economy. Also of importance in this 
discussion is the proliferation of bilateral agreements Syria has signed 
with neighbours, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia. It will be argued 
that these bilateral agreements are more reflective of patterns of Syrian 
trade policy and export capacities. Trade policy can best be described as 
guided by limited liberalization with some continued protectionism of 
domestic industries and markets. As will be suggested throughout, this 
type of segmented economy (liberalization and protectionism) reflects 
Syria’s domestic political economy configurations.  
Policy, Patterns and Liberalization of Syrian Trade 
Syrian trade policy was established by Decree #60 (1952) that was 
promulgated after the breakup of the short-lived customs union with 
Lebanon. This decree empowered the Minister of Trade by giving him 
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the authority to regulate import and export of particular products, as well 
as to establish a licensing system governing imports and exports. 
Because this decree was broadly protectionist, and served as a key pillar 
of the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) model, the Ba’th Party 
never abolished the decree. Under the Ba’th, central planning and the ISI 
model translated into public sector responsibility for the governance and 
regulation of imports and exports. All (legal) trade was monitored, 
regulated, licensed or even undertaken directly by the public sector 
through institutions such as the General Organization for Trade and 
Distribution, and later more specialized bodies such as the General 
Foreign Trade Organization for Textile Materials. The public sector thus 
dominated foreign trade imports and exports and held a monopoly of 
trade regulation, licensing and wholesale distribution. Even the private 
sector was forced to import and export products and goods through these 
institutions. In addition, customs tariffs were erected to protect domestic 
industries. Thus, beginning in the post-independence period, but 
especially when the Ba’th came to power, the public sector remained 
central to all aspects of trade until gradual liberalization decades later.  
Beginning in the 1980s, the government pursued a policy of 
economic austerity. These policies came as a response to the fiscal 
crisis, which was caused by falling oil prices and aid, decreases in 
productivity and output, stagnant wages coupled with rapid inflation. 
The austerity measures were an indication of the government’s inability 
to maintain the etatist policies pursued during the 1970s. This crisis 
exposed the government’s dependence on oil revenues and the distortive 
effects of rentierism in the economy. The thrust of the response to the 
economic crisis was to attempt to generate new sources of foreign 
currency beyond oil production. Perthes states that: “the main task now, 
in the governments view, was to overcome the foreign-exchange crisis 
paralyzing the whole economy. The public sector, along with the rest of 
the economy, was therefore to be reoriented towards exportations.” 
(1995: 47). Syrian trade policy came to be defined by three axes: 
prioritizing the expansion of the oil sector; increasing exports of finished 
products; and the gradual expansion of the private sector.  
The economic crisis of the 1980s initiated a gradual shift away from 
public sector dominance of the economy, an abandonment of the ISI 
model, and the acceptance and encouragement of increased private 
sector activity. Although the private sector remained rent-seeking (see 
Haddad 2004), two decades later the shift away from public sector 
dominance was reflected in the growing private sector share of exports. 
In 1980, the private sector’s share of total exports was 8.1% while in 
2003 its share reached 22.5% (Qallaa 2005). If oil exports, which are 
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entirely dominated by the public sector, are excluded then the private 
sector’s share would be even higher. Qallaa (2005), then Vice President 
of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce, estimated that by the early 
2000s the private sector contributed 63% of GDP, 50% of total 
industrial production and 95% of total agricultural production. These 
figures reflect the liberalizing measures initiated in the 1980s and the 
attempt to generate export growth beyond oil revenues.  
Despite this dramatic increase in private sector trade, Syria’s 
productive capacities remain heavily oriented to the domestic market 
and existing production is primarily in low value added or agricultural 
products. Perhaps most importantly, the Syrian business class remains 
rent-seeking and is not as yet sufficiently oriented towards productive 
growth. There are two other factors that contribute to this export 
structure: the collapse of the ‘soft’ markets of the Soviet bloc, which led 
to a significant decline in exports after the 1990s, and the low level of 
technological input in the production process.  
With the collapse of the Soviet bloc markets, the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and then the European Union (EU) 
became the main destinations for Syrian exports. For example, in 1989 
Syrian exports to EEC countries represented 30% of total trade, while by 
2000 exports to the EU represented over 60% of total trade (Albaladejo 
and Lall, 2004: 4). These figures must be qualified however. First, the 
majority of Syrian exports to the EU consist of oil as the EU is the main 
market for Syrian oil. Second, non-oil exports are primarily cotton or 
agricultural products. Finally, although Syria enjoys a positive trade 
balance with the EU, the EU exports more value-added and diversified 
products to Syria, including machineries, electronic equipment, iron, 
steel, and plastics. These trade patterns are similarly reflected in Syrian 
bilateral trade with Turkey. Likewise, the majority of exports are oil 
while imports are much more diversified.  
According to an International Trade Center (2004) trade 
performance review of Syria, the country enjoys competitive advantage 
in minerals, textiles and fresh food while other sectors, including 
clothing, processed food, manufacturing, and chemicals, lack 
specialization vis-à-vis global producers. Of these three product areas, 
oil is mainly exported to the EU, while textiles and fresh food are 
exported to the Arab World. Syria’s trade with the Arab World thus 
contrasts significantly with its trade patterns with the EU.  
Syria’s exports are concentrated in oil, food and low value 
manufactured products (e.g. textiles). One impact of the dependence on 
oil is the detrimental effect on linkages between sectors. Nugent (1997: 
94) has argued that a diversified export base and wide-ranging export 
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interests across differing sectors contribute positively to further export 
activity while reliance on relatively few sectors limits the possibilities 
for export diversification. Furthermore, Syrian production is 
characterized by low technology and low value added. This is reflected 
in a growing gap between the average value of imports and exports (see 
World Bank 2005; Syrian European Business Center 2003b; Albaladejo 
and Lall 2004). 
Table 1.1: Technological Structure of Exports and Growth Rates in 
Syria and other Arab Countries (in %) 
Annual Growth Rates (1990-2000) 
 HT MT LT RB 
Syria -21.0% -25.6% -6.0% -4.3% 
Egypt 12.6%a 6.1%a -0.8%a 14.5%a 
Jordan 6.3% -2.6% 11.5% 3.3% 
Kuwait 7.3%a 14.4%a 2.0%a 49.6%a 
Oman 13.7% 17.1% 16.5% 11.9% 
Saudi Arabia 37.8% 5.1% 7.3% 6.3% 
Tunisia 8.4% 5.9% 7.4% 3.6% 
Source: Albaladejo and Lall (2004: 6) 
a  = data is only available until 1999 
HT  = High tech 
MT  = Medium tech 
LT  = Low tech 
RB = Resource based 
Figures do not add up to 100% due to the omission of the share of 
primary goods in total exports 
The share of medium and high technology exports from Syrian 
industry are the lowest in the Middle East and North Africa. Albaladejo 
and Lall (2004: 4) note that export figures are less than $3 per capita. 
Although Syria exported some medium and high technology products 
during the 1990s, by 2000 this production had virtually stopped. The 
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technological downgrading of production after the 1990s can largely be 
attributed to the collapse of the Soviet bloc markets where most of the 
medium and high technology products were exported. Table 1 shows 
that the total share of medium and high technology products in 
manufactured exports plunged from 28% in 1990 to only 1% in 2000. 
With the collapse of this market, Syrian producers moved towards 
supplying low value added products to EU and Arab markets. Additional 
analysis provided by the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) ranks Syria 87 out of 88 countries in 
technological sophistication of manufactured exports, and 75 out of 88 
on an index measuring industrial competitiveness (UNIDO 2003).  
  Figure 1.1: Factor Productivity Gaps: All Industrial Sectors  
(Base: Egypt = 0) 
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  Industrial productivity remains at comparatively low levels. 
Figure 1 shows total factor productivity gaps in Syria compared with 
other non-Western countries. ISO certification is another indicator of 
technological capacity. It is estimated that just over 7% of Syrian 
businesses have ISO or other internationally recognized certification for 
their products (World Bank, 2005: 47).  
Low value added production, dependence on oil, and limited 
technological inputs in the production process are the main production 
challenges decision-makers face in formulating trade policy. Three 
policy challenges can be identified. First, there is the task of creating 
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markets for existing Syrian products. Accessing markets through 
reciprocal trade agreements is occurring within the context of the 
continued protection of domestic industry. Thus, trade liberalization is 
gradual, cautious and limited because of the need to maintain a domestic 
protectionist regime. A second challenge is to marketize Syrian 
businesses. This means gradually reducing protectionism and exposing 
Syrian products to regional competition. Since the Syrian bourgeoisie 
remains primarily rent-seeking, this is a particularly complex challenge. 
Finally, there is the issue of meeting financial and budgetary needs in a 
period that will be defined by declining revenues from oil exports and 
fees. While Syria maintains a number of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and 
other forms of taxes and fees on imports, the years ahead will be defined 
by reductions in traditional sources of budgetary revenue, including that 
from foreign trade. The main policy response to these challenges has 
been the negotiation of two multilateral free trade agreements, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the Greater Arab Free Trade Area 
(GAFTA).  
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was born out of the Euro-
Mediterranean Conference held in Barcelona in November 1995. During 
the conference a Partnership was proclaimed between the then 15 
member states of the EU and 12 Southern Mediterranean countries. For 
the EU, the EMP was seen as a means to encourage the ongoing peace 
process as well as to provide cooperative measures to combat perceived 
threats such as Islamism and illegal immigration emanating from the 
Southern Mediterranean, specifically North Africa. The EMP goes 
beyond a traditional economic agreement, instead including three 
chapters outlining fields of cooperation: related to security and stability; 
economic and financial; and cultural, social and human. The initial 
vision of the EMP was to create the largest free trade area in the world 
in addition to providing linkages to address common issues of security 
and political concerns. Gillespie (1997: 1) states “the highly ambitious 
project seeks nothing less than to create a new Euro-Mediterranean 
region”.  
In practice, however, the EMP has reflected less an equal 
partnership than a model of cooperation that favours the economic and 
political interests of the European Union. Joffe (1997: 12) is correct in 
noting that the EMP is simply a reflection of Europe’s hegemony over 
the Mediterranean region and that the Southern Mediterranean countries 
have participated “for lack of an alternative”. This hegemony is 
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evidenced by the proclaimed goals and initiatives of the EMP, which are 
reflected in the above-mentioned three ‘baskets’ covered by the 
Partnership.  
Syria was the final country to ratify the EMP, doing so in December 
2008. Although negotiations had concluded before 2007, both parties 
had failed to sign and ratify the Agreement. The Syrian decision to 
negotiate the EMP, and eventually to sign it, must be seen in part as the 
outcome of political calculations determined by the Syrian leadership. 
The initial decision to enter into serious discussions about ratification of 
the Agreement was in response to growing American and international 
pressure against Syria for its central role in regional affairs, particularly 
in shaping Lebanese domestic politics. Many in the leadership believed 
that the EMP would act as a shelter from American aggression and 
threats. This, however, proved not to be the case and the EMP 
negotiations instead became a forum for further threats lobbed at the 
Syrian leadership by EU countries. While this occurred more recently, 
Aita (2004) noted a number of other global-level political developments 
that altered the terms and context of the EMP for Syrian decision-
makers, including: the failure of the Madrid Peace Conference, 9/11, the 
US-led invasion/occupation of Iraq, Europe’s ‘New Neighbour’ Policy, 
prioritizing relations with Eastern Europe, and international 
developments in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and World Trade Organization (WTO). However, it is too simplistic to 
argue that the failure to ratify the EMP until late 2008 was the outcome 
of purely external political factors. Doing so ignores the significant 
internal debate within the regime and within the intelligentsia and 
business community about the EMP. Therefore, a more accurate 
understanding of Syria’s failure to ratify the EMP until 2008 must be 
tethered to both a political and economic analysis of its costs and 
benefits.  
One argument against the EMP centered on the demands made of 
Syrian policy makers. Syria is expected to join the WTO and harmonize 
its national trade policy with the global trade regime. However, the US 
continues to block Syria’s application. Thus, Syrian policy makers are 
being asked to harmonize their policies with a global trade regime from 
which they receive no benefit (Aita 2004). These requirements also 
include a commitment to adhere to certain fiscal and monetary 
standards, to reduce trade barriers and to strengthen investment 
guarantees, or, in other words, to implement neoliberal policies 
throughout the economy. An equally demanding requirement is the 
harmonization of policy with EU legislation. Syria’s ability to avoid 
policy prescription from the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is 
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lost under these neoliberal measures. Deregulation demanded by the 
EMP is consistent with global neoliberal policies implemented 
throughout the world. Thus, the EMP demands of Syrian policy a radical 
regulatory overhaul that rolls back decades of economic policies. What 
IFIs were not able to accomplish through structural adjustment, the EMP 
will accomplish through its liberalizing provisions. Syrian policy makers 
have traditionally resisted foreign interference in the administration of 
the economy. Some in the Syrian leadership see the EMP as a more 
recent phase of Western encroachment in Syrian affairs and an attempt 
to weaken Syria economically through obliging the state to adopt 
international economic governance norms (Habeeb 2002). 
 Because of the stringent demands made by the EMP, it is no 
surprise that many in Syria have approached membership with extreme 
caution. This is evident in the numerous internal debates about the EMP, 
all of which inevitably accept that in the short-term there will be 
significant negative consequences on the national economy. While 
accepting this, other arguments for and against adopting the EMP in 
Syria concentrated on the anchoring principle: how membership in the 
EMP can contribute to the market transition in Syria. Abdel Nour (2001: 
12) delineates the two camps, arguing that one warns against adoption of 
measures that could have a negative impact on the national economy 
while the other contends that membership in the EMP is necessary to 
accelerate Syria’s integration into the global economy. Supporters of the 
former position argue that economic reforms should proceed gradually 
and in accordance with existing economic capacities, rather than the 
requirements of the EMP. This position warns against the negative 
socio-economic effects associated with the type of rapid liberalization 
and reform demanded by the EMP. The other perspective makes the 
case that the EMP can be an anchor for domestic economic reform and 
should be adopted immediately so that the Syrian economy can 
experience both the negative and positive outcomes of membership. Al-
Shaer (2004), for example, has argued that the EMP provides the 
opportunity to review existing legislation and to initiate reforms that 
draw on the experiences of other Mediterranean countries that have 
ratified the EMP. Hourani (2004) accepts the argument that in the short 
term the Syrian economy will experience negative shocks, but in the 
long term it has much to gain. He identifies and discusses a series of 
areas in which Syria can benefit from the EMP. These are: increased 
trade; positive effects on social and economic development; increases in 
financial and technical aid; increases in foreign investment; reform of 
national industry; and reform of tariff revenues and other fees. 
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 Similar arguments have been advanced in a regional context by 
Hoekman (1998), who considers membership in the WTO and the EMP 
to be beneficial in advancing reform in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Some prominent Syrian academics have also endorsed 
membership in the EMP (Aita 2004; Seifan 2005). They argue that 
while the short-term economic impact of the EMP will be negative, the 
long-term impact will support economic growth and policy and 
institutional reform in Syria. However, as Tovias and Ugur (2004: 413) 
have argued, the EMP has failed as a significant anchor of policy reform 
in the region generally because it has not included more tangible and 
immediate trade concessions to Europe’s southern partners. Concessions 
in sectors such as agriculture and processed foods, which Syrian 
producers could have benefitted from, are absent from the EMP. This is 
owing to Europe’s insistence on subjecting the EMP to the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). This position forbids free trade in any 
commodities covered under the CAP. Essentially, all agricultural 
products exported from the Southern Mediterranean will remain subject 
to tariff barriers. The EMP allows for the reduction of some customs 
duties on certain products, but even these reductions are subject to 
quotas. Thus, while the EMP model demands full liberalization of 
industrial products, trade in agriculture is subjected to limited, or weak, 
liberalization (Hourani 2004). The expansion of the EU to include 
Eastern European countries strengthened the EU’s commitment to 
maintaining these barriers, despite an initial position that supported the 
future negotiation of agricultural provisions.  
 Another criticism of the EMP argues that it seeks to establish a 
hub-and-spoke relationship between the EU (hub) and the Southern 
Mediterranean countries (spoke) (Rivlin 2001: 185). The hub-and-spoke 
model was partly an outcome of the negotiations process: since the 
Southern Mediterranean countries negotiated unilaterally rather than 
collectively, their bargaining power was significantly decreased (Mattli 
2002: 343). Hub-and-spoke trade patterns can have three major impacts 
on the Southern Mediterranean countries: discouraging the development 
of trade relations within the Southern Mediterranean, decreasing 
capacities for policy coordination; and reducing the potential for 
investment.  
 Further concerns about the economic provisions of the EMP can 
be summarized by what Selim (1997: 82) called the ‘four ghosts’: a 
reference to four items in the association agreement that generated 
controversy for their potentially negative impact on the national 
economy: standards and specifications; rules of origin; intellectual 
property rights; and competition policy. The potential impacts emerge 
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from the EU’s determination to impose its own requirements on the 
Southern Mediterranean countries. The EU has insisted on the adoption 
of EU norms and the eventual harmonization and mutual recognition of 
certificates. Syrian exporters are thus required under the EMP to 
conform to EU standards and specifications. However, Syrian producers 
had developed their own standards and specifications that are embedded 
in their production cycle. Meeting EMP requirements requires an 
overhaul of machinery, designs and production practices, something that 
is costly and difficult for many producers, especially Small Market 
Enterprises (SMEs). Despite the EU granting phasing for a period of up 
to twelve years, it seems to be virtually impossible for Syrian exporters 
to satisfy EU standards and specifications. 
 Similarly, the rules of origin requirements are considered a non-
tariff barrier. The EU has insisted on imposing a ceiling on the value of 
the non-originating material as a percentage of the total cost of the final 
product. This requirement contradicts the Uruguay Round agreements 
that merely requires a minimum local added value. This requirement 
could result in the gradual disintegration of local industrial production as 
European products flood local markets while local industries are unable 
to meet rules of origin requirements to export. The EMP rules of origin 
requirements – which violate the global trade regime norms – help 
explain why many in the Syrian business community remained opposed 
to the implementation of the EMP. 
 In addition to the rules of origin requirements, the EU required 
that its own competition rules be included in the EMP. Their argument 
was based on the need to harmonize competition policy to facilitate 
trade relations. According to the EMP, in the fifth year of 
implementation all differentiations between Syrian and EU economic 
actors (public or private sector) would be eliminated. All Syrian public 
sector institutions with monopoly rights would automatically lose them 
in the fifth year of the agreement (Hourani 2004). The adoption of EU 
competition policy is problematic for Syrian exporters. In the case of 
disputes over competition, Syrian exporters would have to resort to 
European and international law firms within the EU, something that 
would generate high costs that many small exporters could not incur 
(Selim 1997: 82). Furthermore, given their lack of experience, it is 
unlikely that local businesses could sufficiently operate within the 
parameters of the new competition policy. This inexperience would 
likely lead to repeated dispute with EU companies. Ghassan Qallaa 
(2005) has argued that the best way to introduce actual competition in 
the Syrian economy is through Syria’s existing bilateral trade 
18    Syrian Foreign Trade and Economic Reform 
  
partnerships, and that the most immediate benefit from these agreements 
will be the introduction of competition within the economy. 
 In fact, Syria has developed its own framework for competition 
policy that is partly inconsistent with EU demands on it. According to 
al-Khidr (2004), Syrian competition policy has aimed to introduce 
competition mechanisms throughout the domestic economy while 
maintaining some protection for domestic industries from external 
competition. Kannan al-Ahmar, a member of the committee of the 
Ministry of Economy and Trade responsible for drafting the competition 
law, confirmed that its creation was a direct consequence of Article 64 
of the EMP,1 which obliges Syria to pass competition and anti-trust 
laws. However, Syrian policy makers, while fulfilling the spirit of 
Article 64 in passing the required laws, did so without adopting EU 
competition laws wholesale. Maher Dabbah (2007: 278-296) has 
demonstrated that Syrian competition law exhibits a curious mix of 
liberalization and protectionism. On the other hand, Syrian competition 
law draws from and tailors to Syria’s own needs liberalizing measures 
from various sources--the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), EU competition rules, the competition 
policies of other Middle Eastern countries, and finally, from the 
competition policy established by the WTO.  
 Syrian competition policy, then, emerged out of the EMP but 
did not meet demands that it mirror EU competition policy. The passing 
of the law nevertheless demonstrates the ways in which the EMP can 
serve as a policy anchor for reform within the economy. The law that 
was passed satisfied many of the EU demands, particularly with regards 
to monopolies. There is a clear momentum towards generating 
competition within the economy and the competition law adds to it in its 
recognition of the role of the private sector and its importation of certain 
liberalizing measures from international conventions. Generally, Syria’s 
competition policy serves two functions: to introduce competition in the 
economy and to reduce protectionism while nevertheless retaining a 
measure of it.  
 This section demonstrates that the short-term and perhaps even 
the long-term economic benefits of the EMP may be minimal for Syria. 
With Syrian oil production dwindling and exports to the EU 
concentrated in a relatively small number of sectors, there seems to be 
small long-term gains from trade. The main possible benefits are the 
institutional and policy reforms generated by the EMP, indeed, its 
‘anchoring’ features. While some have argued that, for this reason, the 
EMP is the best model to promote Arab and Syrian integration into the 
global economy, others have argued more convincingly in favour of 
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inter-Arab integration as a more beneficial stepping-stone for Arab 
countries to integrate into the global economy (Hakimian 2001: 102; 
Laabas 2002). Regardless of the debate about the utility of the EMP, 
there is a consensus that it has served as a major catalyst for trade 
reform and the formulation of trade policy.  
Bilateralism, Free Zones and Foreign Investment:  
The Road to the GAFTA 
A discussion of bilateralism is warranted because of the importance of 
bilateral trade in facilitating Syria’s ascension into both the EMP and the 
GAFTA, a fact confirmed by prominent observers of Syria’s economy 
(Qallaa 2005; Suleiman 2005; al-Amadi 2003). For them, bilateralism 
serves as a framework for generating regional competition, facilitating 
the passage of economic reforms, decreasing public sector monopolies, 
encouraging private sector activity and attracting regional investment. 
Furthermore, given the controversy and uncertainties surrounding the 
EMP, some consider bilateral agreements as the stepping-stone towards 
a preferable route to trade liberalization, namely, greater Arab economic 
cooperation. Moreover, they link Syrian growth and development 
directly to the success of bilateral agreements (Khoury 2002).  
Bilateralism is important in the context of the GAFTA because it 
has allowed Syria to reduce tariffs with neighbouring countries, such as 
Jordan, in accordance with the GAFTA provisions. Perhaps as 
important, the other Arab countries with which Syria negotiated bilateral 
agreements are its main trading partners: Iraq, Saudi Arabia and 
Lebanon. The negotiation of these bilateral agreements meant that Syria 
agreed to implement the terms of the multilateral agreement on a 
bilateral basis to speed up the reduction of customs duties. In fact, in all 
four bilateral agreements there was little deviation from the GAFTA 
provisions (Khoury 2002). Bilateralism represented a vital role in the 
formulation of Syrian trade policy and the country’s ascension into 
multilateral agreements.  
In addition, bilateralism would in principle have a number of 
immediate impacts on Syrian businesses. First, exposing Syrian 
producers to limited regional competition was meant to alleviate some 
of the distortions generated by years of protectionism and central 
planning. Second, bilateralism would encourage competition in the 
domestic market. These agreements, while introducing competition in 
the economy, did so while maintaining some levels of protection for 
domestic producers. In other words, the agreements did not represent a 
full liberalization of trade relations. Also, bilateralism led to immediate 
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increases in trade. This increase suggests the potential for further 
economic partnerships and cooperation, in addition to information and 
market sharing between producers. Finally, bilateralism allowed Syrian 
producers to exploit their existing economies of scale, with their low 
production costs and outputs (Khoury 2002). Bilateral trade provided a 
market for existing Syrian production while encouraging an increase in 
value-added production and the introduction of new technologies in the 
production process.  
Syria’s fifth bilateral agreement is with Turkey, and falls outside of 
the GAFTA framework. Consequently, there is a different strategic logic 
to this agreement, as it has not developed as a stepping-stone towards a 
multilateral partnership. Trade with Turkey is, however, consistent with 
the direction of Syrian trade policy. It also provides market access for 
Syrian producers, the introduction of competitive mechanisms, transfer 
of technology and production practices and information sharing. 
However, unlike bilateral trade with Arab countries, Syrian exports to 
Turkey are predominantly oil (around 80%). This suggests that the 
bilateral agreement will significantly benefit Turkish producers. 
Nevertheless, it is possible under the bilateral agreement and through 
provisions of the Turkish-EU customs union, for Syrian producers to 
export merchandise into Turkey for re-export into the EU. According to 
Qallaa (2005), this provision means that Syrian producers can enjoy the 
same advantages and treatment granted to Turkish producers. 
Conversely, Turkish producers can take advantage of Syria’s GAFTA 
membership through the re-export of merchandise from Syria to the 
wider Arab World. For example, in 2002, the Turkish based Akteks 
Acrylic Thread Industry and Trade Company established a thread 
manufacturing plant in Aleppo with the aim of supplying Syrian and 
Arab markets. The bilateral agreement between Syria and Turkey thus 
allows producers from both countries to re-export products to larger 
markets. The agreement does not include investment and services 
provisions but Turkish investors have channeled significant investment 
into Syrian industry, as the Akteks example above demonstrates.  
Multilateralism: The Greater Arab Free Trade Area  
Inter-Arab trade is often considered rather low. Numerous explanations 
have been offered for this. There are those who rely on political 
arguments grounded in the impact of authoritarianism or the rise of 
political Islam, while others offer more substantive arguments about the 
lack of economic coordination, inefficient infrastructure and the failure 
of trade policy (Hoekman and Khayr al-Din 2000). Shaidi (2005) has 
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argued that inter-Arab trade is low because of the lack of product 
complementarity. However, arguments that inter-Arab trade is low, and 
that the structure of Arab economies do not lend themselves to 
integration, do not stand up to scrutiny and much of the more 
substantive literature on Arab economic integration demonstrates quite 
the opposite (al-Kawaz 1999). While total export figures would support 
the assumption of low inter-Arab trade, the fact that Arab countries 
supply most of the world’s oil means that they should have a higher 
percentage of trade with countries outside the Arab World, as oil is the 
most widely traded product in the world. However factoring out oil 
exports as a percentage of total trade, inter-Arab trade is in fact quite 
high and comparable to other regions of the world, including Latin 
America. Even in the late 1990s, before significant GAFTA measures 
had been initiated, the intra-regional trade figures, excluding oil, was as 
high as 19% of total exports (Dervic et al. 1998). Moreover, inter-Arab 
trade within subgroups or regions is also quite high. Ali Bolbol and 
Ayten Fatheldin (2005) of the Economic Policy Institute at the Arab 
Monetary Fund estimated that 75% of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s 
(GCC) intra-Arab trade is with other GCC members, for Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU) countries the figure is 65% and for Mashreq countries 
35%.  
Despite these promising inter-Arab trade patterns countries in the 
Arab World have had differential trading regimes, with some being 
members of the WTO, and others falling outside the global trade regime. 
Although a series of bilateral agreements exist between Arab countries 
and their neighbours, in addition to agreements with the EU such as the 
EMP, it is GAFTA, the largest multilateral agreement that Arab 
countries have agreed to collectively, that has the potential to overcome 
these divergences and deepen inter-Arab trade. The GAFTA is an 
agreement aimed at eliminating import duties and other barriers to trade 
in goods between Arab countries and at harmonizing trade regimes 
among the Arab states. The following is a summary of the main features 
of the GAFTA model (see Syrian European Business Center 2003b: 46): 
• Removal of all tariffs on all goods exchanged between 
signatories 
• Treatment of goods included in the programme as national 
goods 
• 40% added value requirement to fulfill rules of origin 
• Exclusion of a maximum of ten (10) agricultural products 
from tariff exemption during the harvest period (eventually 
to be phased out) 
• Tariff-like charges and taxes to be treated as normal tariffs 
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• Elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs); a reciprocity 
principle for unjustified NTBs was agreed on 
• Special treatment of the less developed Arab countries and 
Palestine 
 The framework of the GAFTA is by and large consistent with 
the requirements of Article XXIV of the GATT (1994) dealing with 
customs unions and free trade areas. However, al-Khalidi (1999: 214-
216) has outlined three principles of the GAFTA that are not in 
agreement with the GATT requirements. The first relates to the principle 
of national treatment. Under the GAFTA, goods originating outside of 
GAFTA countries are not given national treatment while the GATT 
(1994) requires that all products be afforded national treatment, 
regardless of their source, once they arrive in the domestic market. The 
second principle in violation of the GATT is that which allows member 
countries to exchange tariff exemption beyond the specified ten-year 
timetable through bilateral agreements concluded outside the GAFTA 
framework. Article XXIV permits regional blocs but not bilateral 
agreements, which must be granted a waiver under the GATT/WTO 
rules. Finally, the principle forbidding non-tariff restrictions is 
inconsistent with Article XXIV insofar as it fails to specify the 
mechanisms by which the non-tariff barriers (NTBs) should be removed.  
 The GAFTA is a substantial improvement on previous attempts 
at integration. However, it does have serious weaknesses and limits on 
top of its incongruence with the global trade regime. The structural 
weakness of the GAFTA originates in the fact that it has been 
constructed with cooperation and not integration as the underlying 
principle of the agreement (el-Imam 2002: 253). In eschewing 
institutional integration, the GAFTA model resembles the loose Open 
Regionalism (OR) of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
because it is based on voluntary understanding, the absence of any 
supranational authority, and an alleged consensual style of negotiation. 
This is in contrast to the closed models of regionalism, such as the EU, 
which concentrate on institution building and developing regional 
modes of governance. In the APEC context, Poon claims OR is 
“associated more with establishing a neutral international space for the 
facilitation of ideas, business and networks than with the creation of 
governance structures that enhance institutional presence”. APEC 
countries and GAFTA signatories have rejected the neofunctionalist 
interpretation of regionalism that encourages functional linkages in 
policy areas accompanied with institutional building, in favour of a 
regional model grounded in (fluid) adherence to international trade 
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practices. Indeed, OR, as it developed in APEC was a reaction against 
European style integration that stressed the deepening of regional 
interdependence and the development of institutions to deepen 
integration; instead, APEC members sought to maintain control over 
their domestic economic policy. GAFTA is similar and indeed is 
actually less developed than APEC which has provisions for investments 
or services GAFTA lacks.  
 Another feature of the OR model is voluntarism and weak 
decision-making and enforcement mechanisms that have relied on a 
‘follow the leader’ approach to policy harmonization within the region. 
To be sure, on paper, GAFTA’s organizational structure looks 
impressive. All GAFTA work is conducted through the League of Arab 
States (LAS) and is operated through the Economic and Social Council 
of the LAS, a ministerial council of the member states with the power 
and mandate to make binding decisions. The Implementation and 
Follow-Up Committee (IFC) is the executive arm of the GAFTA. Its 
membership is drawn from the ministerial undersecretaries, and it is 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the GAFTA as well as 
reviewing and supervising reports provided by the GAFTA’s technical 
committees. The IFC is also the acting dispute resolution body. The 
Trade Negotiation Committee (TNC) consists of economic experts from 
member states who review mechanisms for removing non-tariff barriers 
and for treating Arab duty-free zone products. The Rules of Origin 
Committee (ROC) is a technical committee comprised of economic 
experts nominated by the member states and works towards establishing 
region-wide rules of origin. Other committees include the Customs 
Committee (CC), which works towards harmonizing the customs 
systems of member states, and the Standards and Specification 
Committee (SSC), which tries to harmonize Arab trade standards and 
attempts to ensure their compliance with international trade standards.  
 In their actual operations, however, these structures have weak 
institutional capabilities consistent with OR (Sekouti 1999). A major 
indicator of this is that GAFTA places very few obligations on members 
to abide by its rules. There is an absence of transparency and no strong 
dispute settlement forums. Measures aimed at enforcing the agreement 
are weak, so signatories can evade certain provisions and ignore others 
without any punishment. Furthermore, the lack of institutions means that 
there are few mechanisms to facilitate and encourage trade. There are no 
institutions created by GAFTA to collect and distribute information 
regarding, for example, prices or product specifications.  
 GAFTA is also modest in what it attempts. An obvious 
weakness is GAFTA’s numerous tariff exemptions. In addition, multiple 
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NTBs, not covered under the agreement, continue to impede trade by 
imposing additional costs. Nor does GAFTA establish a unified tariff 
wall against imports from outside the Arab region. It excludes other 
areas of inter-Arab economic cooperation, particularly services and 
investment. The consequent lack of region-wide investment regulations 
serves as a deterrent to inter-Arab investment. Indeed, with the region 
being awash in petrodollars, and investment pouring in to capital scarce 
states from the oil-rich countries, regional investment and services 
regulations seem to be more needed than ever. Another significant 
shortcoming of the GAFTA model is the set of requirements that 
determine rules of origin. For all intents and purposes, individual Arab 
countries continue to employ different mechanisms to determine these 
rules. Although the agreed upon figure was 40% of value added, the 
requirements have not yet been harmonized between Arab countries. 
The determination of rules of origin is thus complex, subject to national 
laws, and generally applied with substantial inconsistency; this risks 
fragmenting GAFTA.2  
 There is seemingly no intention to expand the scope of the 
GAFTA. As with APEC, the GAFTA is entirely driven by economic 
rationales, while social or political provisions are entirely ignored. 
Expanding its power over issues such as investment and services is thus 
not a likely future scenario, despite discussions of such an expansion. 
The GAFTA design has rejected any centralization of decision-making 
authority, ensuring that domestic institutions will remain the 
determinants of economic policy. The weak and decentralized structure 
of the GAFTA suggests that it will have minimal influence in shaping 
national economic policy. However, for countries such as Syria that are 
outside of the WTO regime, adherence to the GAFTA principles does 
entail a significant move towards marketizing and internationalizing the 
economy; for countries such as Bahrain that are already members of the 
WTO the GAFTA has no policy anchoring benefits. In summary, the 
model is premised on increasing cooperation emerging as the outcome 
of market or industrial integration and the increasing mobility of 
regional capital, rather than being promoted by strong institutional 
arrangements. 
 The minimalist approach to regionalism is not coincidental and 
is, rather, congruent with the domestic political economies of its 
member states. It allows GAFTA countries to pursue cooperation while 
maintaining some protection of the local economy. This model 
resembles what Jayasuriya (2003) calls ‘embedded mercantilism’. He 
argues that domestic configurations of economic and political power are 
reflected in the models of multilateral cooperation/integration that 
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emerge within a region. Thus, GAFTA is consistent with Jayasuriya’s 
assessment that “Open regionalism is not about regional market making 
but about maintaining export markets; and it is also about helping to 
cement the dominant coalition between domestic cartels in the non-
tradeable sector and the tradeable sector. For these reasons, open 
regionalism may be seen as denoting a particular political project of 
regional integration undertaken by powerful domestic actors” 
(Jayasuriya, 2003: 341). One of the appeals, then, of the OR model for 
domestic networks is precisely its informal nature that relies on 
consensual governance rather than rules-based governance. In the Arab 
World, as in East Asia, where the power and positions of ruling elites is 
directly tethered to existing political and economic structures, the 
creation of governance models outside of the state’s influence represents 
a direct threat to existing patterns of political and economic power (Ibid) 
and would, hence, not be permitted. 
 Understanding the formation and consolidation of segmented 
economies is particularly important in explaining the model of 
multilateralism pursued in the Arab World. A segmented political 
economy refers to a separation between two spheres of economic 
activity. On the one hand, there exists export production that is 
liberalized, while, on the other, there are rent-seekers whose close ties 
with the political leadership ensure domestic economic opportunities 
that will, through economic policy, remain protected and not become 
subject to regional competition. A segmented economy is thus one that 
feigns liberalization through international obligations, multilateral trade 
agreements, and limited trade liberalization, but in reality remains highly 
protected and consolidated. The economic demands of ruling coalitions, 
and the necessity of regimes to maintain them, are thus reflected in the 
GAFTA model which does not call for integration – a threat to domestic 
coalitions, rent-seeking opportunities, and access to power – but rather 
cooperation – a model that allows for domestic coalitions to maintain 
their protected rent channels. The project of OR in the Arab World has 
promoted a form of embedded mercantilism – outward export 
orientation coupled with continued forms of domestic protectionism and 
coalition building – that reflects the segmented political economies of 
member states, particularly Syria (see Haddad 2004). Thus, Guerrieri 
(1997: 158) is correct in suggesting that the OR model requires a 
simultaneous move towards market convergence while maintaining 
domestic state control over economic rules, regulations and policy.  
  On the basis of the above discussion the following features 
underpin the GAFTA: 1) open regionalism as a strategy of trade 
liberalization; 2) Informal, rather than rules-based, governance; 3) 
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Segmented political economies that are divided between liberalized and 
protected sectors. This suggests that the domestic political economy 
configurations – defined by continued authoritarian rule, oil dependence, 
the structural legacies of protectionism and central planning, and centers 
of political-economic power that are directly tethered to the state/regime 
– has created this distinctive form of multilateralism that encourages 
liberalization while discouraging integration. This lack of institutional 
integration in OR, is, according to el-Erian (2000: 81) currently 
appropriate since deeper regional integration would only be possible 
following greater domestic economic reform which would threaten 
ruling coalitions.  
 What potential does GAFTA have to promote the liberalization 
of Arab and specifically Syrian foreign trade in spite of the limited 
nature of the OR model it has adopted? Can the GAFTA generate 
developmental gains in the Arab countries, and serve as a catalyst for 
economic growth in Syria and in the region as a whole? The signs are 
mixed. GAFTA can do little to overcome certain built-in limitations to 
regional trade, namely the continued reliance of regional states on oil 
exports and the relatively small size of Arab markets compared to Asia 
and Europe, both of which ensure that much Arab trade will continue to 
be with partners outside the region.  
 On the other hand, as table 2 indicates, inter-Arab trade has 
indeed been increasing, although it is still too early to assess the full 
impact of GAFTA. During the period identified below, there was a 
greater increase in intra-regional non-oil exports than in total global 
non-oil exports. Moreover, Dervic et al. (1998) observed in the late 
1990s that inter-regional non-oil trade is characterized by higher value 
added goods than the region’s non-oil exports to other countries. 
Table 1.2: Ratio of Total Inter-Arab Trade to Total External Trade,  
1997-2006. 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
8.71 9.07 8.34 7.82 8.76 10.16 
10.2
7 
11.6
9 
10.8
1 
11.0
4 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund. 
 If we think of the GAFTA region in terms of three regions – 
Maghreb, Mashreq and Gulf – then it is clear that the most intense trade 
between Arab countries is occurring in two regions, the Mashreq and the 
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Gulf. According to Hoekman and Messerlin (2002) several Arab 
countries that have a high proportion of total exports to Arab countries, 
such as Jordan, Bahrain, Syria and Yemen, have the most to gain from 
pursuing Arab economic cooperation. By virtue of their existing trade 
partners and patterns, the volume of existing regional trade, and the 
bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries, Syrian producers are 
well positioned to integrate within the regional Arab market in ways that 
other Arab countries, such as the Maghreb countries, are not.  
 The Syrian export economy is characterized by two contrasting 
trade patterns. On the one hand, oil represents the bulk of the country’s 
total exports, both in terms of volume and value. On the other hand, 
inter-Arab exports consist mostly of agricultural and manufactured 
products. This is an important division to highlight, as it suggests that 
Syrian producers’ inter-regional trade could serve as a mechanism by 
which the country diversifies its export structure. The GAFTA will also 
be important to Syria’s economy because of the potential it offers Small 
Market Enterprises (SMEs) for gaining market access (Khoury 2002). 
Currently, SMEs constitute over 85% of all Syrian businesses. For 
example, in the textile sector, the number of establishments with more 
than ten employees is around 2500, accounting for around 3% of total 
textile production. There are over 5000 companies with between 6 and 9 
workers, accounting for 6% of textile production, while the remaining 
91% have between 1 and 5 workers, meaning that they are family run 
establishments. The GAFTA provides these latter businesses with 
opportunities for production and export expansion that was discouraged 
under previous tariff regimes. For Syrian policy makers, the GAFTA 
seems to confirm two of the fundamental arguments surrounding the 
relationship between regional trading agreements (RTAs) and 
multilateralism: first, that RTAs are building blocks to more global 
trade, and second, that the geographic proximity of countries plays a 
crucial role in implementing free trade agreements (Tussie and Woods 
2000).  
  However, GAFTA has not yet led to full liberalization of 
Syrian trade. Several non-tariff barriers remain an obstacle to trade 
liberalization. All imports are subject to import licenses issues by the 
Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade. Although private importers 
can easily obtain these licenses, they incur a charge of 1.5% of the total 
import value, which is to be paid to the Ministry. Furthermore, many 
imports remain prohibited by the Ministry’s protection list. A second 
major NTB are state monopolies. The import process is often delayed 
because of requirements that many goods have to be channeled through 
state trade enterprises. In some cases, acquiring new machinery in the 
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food industry has taken between one and two years. Recently, these 
restrictions have been lifted for the private sector, yet they remain for 
public sector enterprises. A third NTB is a ceiling on the total value of 
export shipments imposed on exporters. If the value of the exports 
exceeds 300% of the exporter’s net worth, the exporter must deposit 
50% of the export value in excess of the 300% ceiling at the 
Commercial Bank of Syria. In effect, this discourages successful Syria 
exporters.  
Nevertheless, GAFTA will likely continue to serve as the main 
market for Syrian producers in the future. First, as oil production 
decreases, the percentage of total exports to Syria’s hitherto main 
market, the EU, also decreases. In 2007, according to the Syrian Central 
Bureau of Statistics, Syria’s trade, measured both in volume and value, 
was higher with the Arab World then Europe. Second, also in 2007, for 
the first time in decades, the Syrian private sector was the major 
importer and exporter in Syria. The public sector enterprises have thus 
lost their central role in Syria’s export economy, the culmination of a 
process of reform and transition in Syria’s internationalization that 
began in the 1980s. Thus, the decline of oil revenues, the decrease in the 
share of exports to the EU, the rise of the Syrian private sector as the 
main engine of internationalization, all suggest that the GAFTA will 
provide the strategic and valuable market for Syrian producers in the 
immediate future. While the GAFTA does not include institutional 
support or financial assistance as the EMP does, it is generating trade, 
investment and integration in ways that the EMP cannot. Although the 
GAFTA has many flaws, the loose, open model for cooperation is more 
reflective of Syria’s existing economic patterns of trade and production 
and, most importantly, the configuration of its domestic political 
economy. 
A perhaps unexpected benefit for Syria is that GAFTA membership 
makes it much more attractive for foreign investors since the agreement 
greatly expands the market for investors beyond the Syrian domestic 
market. Syria’s GAFTA membership has attracted private sector 
investment from Asian, Russian and Chinese investors who have sought 
to exploit Syria’s GAFTA membership. These investments have largely 
been channeled towards industrial projects in Syria’s free trade zones 
(FTZ). For Syria, Adnan Suleiman (2005) has argued, FTZ are 
important as conduits of broader regional and international trade. Thus, 
investment in FTZs enhances the export potential of the receiving 
country. Moreover, the existing investments in free zones reflect the 
importance of Syria as a regional conduit to the Arab World through 
GAFTA.  
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In 2004, the General Organization of Free Trade Zones estimated 
that total investments stood at 1.8 billion SYP, up from only 826 million 
SYP in 2000. In 2007, it was estimated that Syrian free zones had 932 
operating businesses, including 7 banks, 812 trade firms, 82 industrial 
operations and 30 services ventures, employing around  
22,000 workers.3 One of the most ambitious FTZ projects is the Chinese 
Business City4 in the FTZ of Adra, north of Damascus. This project 
involves an investment of $6.7 million USD over an area of 7,000 sqm 
and will accommodate around 200 Chinese companies that will ship 
goods to Syria with the aim of re-exporting them to Arab countries 
under the terms of GAFTA. The majority of investment in Syrian FTZ 
follows this pattern, positioning Syria as a regional hub in emerging 
trade networks linking Arab and non-Arab countries. 
The majority of investment in the FTZ has been in car 
manufacturing. Specifically, Korean, Iranian, Russian and Chinese 
investments have established multiple manufacturing plants to supply 
domestic and regional markets. Korean car manufacturer KIA Motors 
has been licensed to establish a car manufacturing plant in Syria at a cost 
of $20 million USD. According to KIA’s plans, around 15,000 cars a 
year will be produced in the plant that will target both local and regional 
markets.5 The official KIA agent in Syria is the Ghreiwati Group, a 
Syrian based company that specializes in manufacturing insulated wire 
and cables, as well as automotive parts, home appliances and textiles. 
The Group is also the official agent of other brands in Syria, including 
The Ford Group’s Ford and Lincoln. The Ghreiwati Group is headed by 
the President of the Damascus Chamber of Industry as well as a 
shareholder in Cham Holdings and a founding shareholder in one of the 
Syrian private banks, LF Bank Syria. 
Similarly, in 2005 the Iranian company Saipa Corporation signed an 
agreement with the local Syrian company Hamish to establish a 
manufacturing plant with an annual capacity of around 15,000 cars with 
the aim of targeting both the local and regional markets. Saipa will own 
80% of the joint venture while Hamish will own the remaining 20%. 
The plant is planned to be built in Hama and will produce a car called 
‘The Pride’ which is popular for Syrian taxis. The Saipa-Hamish project 
is not the only joint venture between Syrian and Iranian interests. Iran 
Khodro, Iran’s largest car manufacturing company, has signed an 
agreement with the state-owned General Organisation for Engineering 
Industries and a private firm, Al-Sultan trading, to build a plant in Syria 
to produce 10,000 cars annually that will produce the Iranian Samand 
model. 
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Izh-Avto International, a joint venture between Russia’s Izhmash 
and Korea’s Hyundai, plans another manufacturing plant in Syria. 
According to Rusten Shiyanov, Director-General of the Izhmash 
holding, Syria is one of three countries in the Middle East (Egypt and 
Iran being the other two) where the company plans to assemble as many 
as 25,000 cars annually for local and regional consumption.6 In 2007, 
the Russian truck manufacturer Kamaz Inc. established an assembly 
plant in Hessia, an industrial city near Homs. Kamaz plans to begin 
production at around 1,000 trucks, of which distribution will be split 
between domestic and regional markets. Kamaz is planned to own half 
of the ownership of the planned company, and a group of private Syrian 
investors the other half. The Kamaz company already exports around 
500 trucks a year to Syria. The establishment of the Hessia plant will 
allow the company to expand in an existing market while increasing its 
exposure to regional Arab markets.  
While the GAFTA does not cover services and investment 
regulations, it has nevertheless led to a significant increase in investment 
in Syria as companies from Korea, Iran, Russia, Turkey and China 
exploit Syria’s geographic position and its trade agreements with 
regional neighbours. Although GAFTA has indirectly generated 
investment in Syria from non-Arab countries, the main impacts have 
been realized in the inter-Arab economic arena. Bilateral agreements, 
free trade zones, and foreign investment have thus facilitated Syria’s 
transition towards the multilateral GAFTA model and served as conduits 
for a broader multilateral trade agenda. 
The GAFTA is best understood, particularly from the Syrian 
perspective, as the outcome of particular constellations of political and 
economic power within member countries and within the region as a 
whole. It is precisely the type of statism exhibited in the political 
economies of Arab countries which has enabled the specific forms of 
regional cooperation within the OR model: limited institutional 
integration, weak governance mechanisms, and, ultimately, the state 
remaining the main arbiter of economic policy. From this perspective, 
the GAFTA is a model of internationalization that interconnects 
coherently with political-economic power embedded in the Arab 
World’s domestic political economies.  
Conclusion 
Although the GAFTA represents an OR model, it is the most advanced 
form of inter-Arab cooperation in the postcolonial era. Despite its loose 
model, the GAFTA has initiated a number of policy shifts within Syria 
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that have significantly liberalized the country’s export sector. Khoury 
(2002) has identified the transition away from central planning towards 
regional competition as the most important aspect of GAFTA for Syrian 
producers. Increased Arab cooperation also holds the possibility for 
generating growth and development within the region as a whole. The 
Arab region, and Syria’s geographic and economic position within the 
region, has attracted non-Arab investors, as is shown by Russian and 
Asian investors’ willingness to invest in Syrian industry.  
These features of the GAFTA contrast sharply with those of the 
EMP which are likely to be less beneficial for Syria. Firstly, Syria’s 
trade with Europe is heavily dominated by oil which is not affected by 
the EMP. Any liberalization of trade between the EU and Syria would 
thus have negligible impacts on Syrian producers, but it would open 
Syria to increased competition from European exporters. On the other 
hand, the EMP, unlike the GAFTA, offers financial support to Syrian 
infrastructural, institutional and policy development through a number 
of financial schemes. In this sense, the Syrian-EU Agreement is more 
institutionally developed than the GAFTA.  
Since both multilateral agreements are different, they tend to offer 
complementary incentives for Syrian producers, bureaucrats and 
officials. It is clear that internationalization is a principal component of 
Syria’s current economic policy. Economic cooperation with Arab 
countries is an initial step towards deeper integration into the regional 
division of labour. Now that the Syrian leadership has ratified the EMP, 
they have moved the country closer towards harmonizing policy with 
the global trade regime.  
This essay has demonstrated the multiple and sometimes 
contradictory shifts in Syrian trade policy in relation to both the GAFTA 
and EMP. As has been argued throughout, the GAFTA is an agreement 
that most reflects Syria’s current trade capacities and, more importantly, 
its domestic political economy configuration. While the EMP does not 
provide the same cover for Syria’s segmented economy, it can act as an 
anchor to encourage policy makers to adopt policies consistent with the 
global trade regime. While the two agreements have differing trade 
creating benefits, Syrian trade policy remains focused on building and 
sustaining bilateral agreements and utilizing these agreements as 
stepping-stones towards achieving more substantive cooperation with 
regional neighbours.  
Trade policy in Syria cannot be divorced from the country’s broader 
marketization strategy (Abboud 2009). The ability of producers to 
mobilize resources, penetrate new markets and integrate new practices 
into the production cycle is necessary in order to support the transition 
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away from oil dependence. In the context of a global political economy 
increasingly governed by finance and neoliberal orthodoxy, the Syrian 
leadership may have some difficulty in convincing its trading partners of 
the redeeming features of its ‘social market economy’. The Syrian 
leadership will need to be creative in order to manage regional 
cooperation while satisfying its domestic coalition base. 
This essay has argued that the challenges faced by Syrian trade 
policy emanate from its existing production structure, existing trade 
patterns, and the provisions of the multilateral agreements themselves. 
Production in Syria remains concentrated in low and medium value 
added products. Trade patterns remain skewed because of the 
dominance of oil exports in Syria’s export sector. As oil production 
decreases, Syria’s export sector will assume new patterns. In the short-
term, Syrian producers may have difficulty competing in regional 
markets. However, both the EMP and the GAFTA hold potential long-
term benefits for Syrian producers and the country’s trade regime 
including the support for policy and institutional changes, foreign 
investment, institutionalization of norms, increased value added 
production, and the alleviation of oil dependency.  
                                                
1 Interview with The Syria Report, December 1, 2005.  
2 This framework can have detrimental effects on trade as Sally (2006) has 
argued in the case of East Asia. After pursuing non-discriminatory unilateral 
liberalization – a principle embedded in the GAFTA model – many counties in 
East Asia began signing discriminatory free trade agreements (FTAs). The 
emergent FTAs in East Asia precluded broader regional integration and instead 
established a series of subregional trade patterns. According to Sally (2006), 
these FTAs were not catalysts for regional integration or further integration with 
the global economy. Rather, they moved the East Asia region towards economic 
disintegration, leading to a stalling of unilateral liberalization and structural 
reforms. The OR model lends itself to discriminatory FTAs, subregional 
concentration of trade, and hence, economic disintegration. This is of particular 
concern in the GAFTA area given existing trade patterns that are heavily 
concentrated within the three subregions of the Arab World. 
3 ‘Private firms to manage new free zones’ The Syria Report, February 26, 
2007. 
4 Some have referred to this as ‘China Town’. 
5 ‘KIA motors, LG to build assembly plants in Syria’ The Syria Report 
February 9, 2005. 
6 ‘Russian car manufacturer to set up assembly plant in Syria’ The Syria 
Report August 26, 2002. 
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The Effect of Trade Liberalization on 
Syrian Industry: The Case of Textile 
and Olive Oil Industry 
Salam Said 
Introduction 
In the framework of the trade policy reform starting in the late 1990s, 
Syria has begun to open its market due to a number of reciprocal 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements.  
In addition to the regional free trade agreement with the Arab States, 
the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), Syria has signed free trade 
agreements on a bilateral level, e.g. with Lebanon in 1998, Jordan in 
2002 and Turkey in 2004. Moreover, Syria has undertaken several 
unilateral measures of trade liberalization, such as unilateral tariff 
reduction, simplification of administrative importation procedures and 
abolishment of import bans for certain commodities. 
 Due to this liberal-oriented trade policy, many domestic 
industries, which have been highly protected for a long time, will face 
fierce competition from foreign suppliers in their domestic market. The 
textile and clothing (T&C) industry and the olive oil industry are among 
the key economic sectors in Syria due to their backward linkages with 
agro industrial sectors (cotton, olives) and their prominent position as an 
employer of a large share of the industrial working force. These 
industries -which were and are still strongly protected- will be in 
particular affected by opening up the market and by the increased 
competition. However, they could at the same time gain from a new 
opening up of external markets due to the free trade agreements with the 
Arab countries and with Turkey. 
 The main objective of this paper is to analyse the effects of the 
GAFTA compared with those of unilateral trade liberalization measures 
on the Syrian textile and olive oil industries. According to the theory of 
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regional economic integration, Free Trade Areas lead to intensified 
interregional trade among signatory-member states owing to the trade 
creation (within the common market) and trade diversion (away from 
markets outside the agreement area) after trade tariffs within the area are 
eliminated. In addition, Free Trade Areas increase the long-term 
efficiency and competitiveness of the affected sectors in member 
countries as a result of economies of scale and the effects of competition. 
These effects are expected to take place among Syria and Arab States as 
well as between Syria and Turkey, since Syria has already signed free 
trade agreements with these countries. 
 However, the expected effects of the free trade agreements 
depend in essence on the implementation of the trade liberalization 
amongst the member countries. GAFTA, which came to force in 2005, 
is still fully implemented neither in Syria nor in other member countries. 
The more similar the export structures of the GAFTA member countries, 
the higher the trade barriers have been among them and the more 
protected the domestic market.  
Textiles and olive oil rank among the most protected commodities 
in the GAFTA member countries, especially where these industries play 
a key role in the economy. As a consequence, the promising effects of 
the GAFTA on Syrian industries, i.e. market enlargement and enhanced 
competition in the domestic market, as well as the potentially damaging 
effect of external competition on them, are and will remain limited as 
long as the free trade agreement among the member countries is not 
fully realized. 
 This paper will, firstly, give an overview of the T&C and olive 
oil industries in Syria and, secondly, assess trade liberalization progress 
on unilateral, bilateral and regional levels that has been undertaken in 
Syria since 1997 in regards to the imports of T&C and olive oil. The 
following section will present the impact of trade liberalization on the 
examined industries, particularly that undertaken due to GAFTA. 
Finally, some concluding remarks will indicate the reasons for the 
insufficient implementation of GAFTA in its member countries, in 
particular Syria.  
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An Overview of the Textile and Olive Oil  
Industries in Syria 
Textile and Clothing  
The T&C industry plays a key role in the Syrian economy and 
represents an important pillar of manufacturing industry. It employs 
almost 22% of the industrial labour force and makes up approximately 
20% of the gross industrial output; it also represents 22% of the 
industrial Net Domestic Product (NDP). Over the past seven years, T&C 
exports constituted on average 32%1 of non-oil exports and around 9% 
of total exports. The comparative advantage of the Syrian T&C industry 
rests on two factors: (a) Syria’s large scale production of cotton, which 
is a core raw material in the industry; (b) its relatively low labour cost. 
The contribution of the T&C industry is expected to grow further, 
especially with the gradual decline of oil exports as a result of 
deteriorating Syrian oil production. 
 The T&C industry is one of the oldest industries in Syria. The 
first textile mills with modern machinery were installed in the 1920s. At 
that time, Syria was under the French mandate which systematically 
extended cotton plantations and built up many new ones in order to 
supply the textiles industry in France. As a result, the planted cotton 
surface rose within one year from 800 square meters in 1923 to over 
35,660 square meters in 1924. After Syrian independence in 1946 this 
kind of cotton policy was continued in order to supply the growing 
national T&C industry and to further increase the exports of cotton 
(Khoury (no date): 77).  
In the 1950s, numerous private textile companies were established 
and, for a number of years, they were successfully exporting a good part 
of their production. In the 1960s, however, most of these companies 
were nationalized (Syrian European Business Centre (SEBC) 2003a: 16-
17). Consequently, the private textile sector was largely absorbed into a 
few large public companies, driving private capital and investments 
abroad. Since then, the private T&C companies have been dominated by 
small and medium scale family businesses (SEBC 2003d: 6-9). 
Furthermore, a public monopoly had been developed in core segments 
of the industry, namely the cotton ginning and marketing sector.  
 As part of the economic reform policy in the 1990s, the Syrian 
government issued Investment Law No. 10, which promotes local and 
foreign investments and re-emphasizes the role of the private sector in 
the economy. New amendments to the law were made in 2000, offering 
additional facilities for private investments (SEBC 2003c: 20-25). 
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Following this, approximately 377 investment projects in T&C were 
announced by the Ministry of Industry at the end of 2005. Nonetheless, 
the public sector remains the leading agent in the economy, as it 
maintains its monopolistic position in the cotton textile industry.  
The Cotton sector 
Cotton is a major agro-industrial product in Syria. In 2001 the cotton 
sector represented about 7.2% of the Syrian GDP (Sustainable Business 
Associates 2003: 10). Furthermore, the cotton industry provides income 
for about 2.7 million farmers and their dependents, which make up about 
15% of the population (IMF 2006: 53-56). According to International 
Cotton Advisory Committee, Syria produces an average of 1-2% of the 
world cotton production and is, therefore, ranked among the world’s 
leading cotton producers and exporters. Due to a promotional 
government cotton policy2, the production of cotton and the cultivated 
area have been increasing since 1965. In the last five years, annual raw 
cotton production ranged between 700,000 and a million tons (IMF 
2006: 53). Raw cotton exports, which constitute about 10% of the total 
non-oil exports, are considered the second most important source for 
foreign currency (3.9% of total export earnings) after gas and oil. 
(Sustainable Business Associates 2003: 9).  
The cotton market is protected against foreign suppliers by a ban on 
imports. Syrian cotton production, marketing and ginning are 
monopolized by the government’s Cotton Ginning and Marketing 
Organization (CGMO3). The CGMO purchases raw cotton from the 
farmers at subsidized premium prices4 which are higher than 
international-raw-cotton prices and sells it to the domestic and foreign 
markets (SEBC 2000: 13, USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2007: 4). 
Normally, about 50-60% of the raw cotton is exported without further 
processing. In 2001, the CGMO decided to sell cotton to domestic 
spinners at international prices (prices determined on monthly basis) in 
order to encourage private textile manufacturers. The private sector, 
however, still uses only a small portion of local raw cotton. 
Company profiles and main products  
The Syrian T&C sector is operated by public and private companies. 
The General Organization of Textile Industries represents the public 
T&C sector and consists of 27 companies: nine cotton spinning mills; 
eight cotton weaving mills; two clothing factories for cotton underwear; 
two carpet factories (100% wool); four textile factories for wool, silk 
fabrics, mixed and synthetic textiles and socks respectively, and two 
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clothing factories for ready-to-wear clothing. In 2006, the number of 
employees in these companies varied between 400 and 3,8005. 
Table 1: The main products of the Syrian T&C sector during 2000-2003 
Type of 
Product 
Unit 
Total Production Private Sector (%) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Cotton 
Yarns 
Ton 78019 82975 90600 98374 0 0 0 0 
Mixed 
Woolen 
Yarns 
Ton 2364 2744 2675 2353 0 0 0 0 
Textiles 
Yarns 
Ton 446 397 273 311 0 0 0 0 
Silk 
Yarns 
Ton 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cotton 
Textiles  
Ton 21559 25067 27777 29089 46 50 46 46 
Woollen 
Textiles 
Ton 6481 7244 8274 8535 95 91 92 96 
Synthetic 
Textiles 
Ton 20364 21463 24036 24750 99 100 93 95 
Silk Tex-
tiles 
Ton 10 25 30 30 100 100 100 100 
Under 
Wear 
Clothes 
D.000 6556 6277 7586 8190 89 88 88 94 
Ready 
ـMade 
Clothes 
P.000 35116 48317 51868 54738 97 98 98 98 
Tricot  P.000 14725 14441 15282 16072 100 100 100 100 
Carpets M2000 1705 1982 2211 2458 77 80 80 84 
Stockings D.000 4410 6312 7126 8003 96 98 98 98 
Blankets P.000 429 425 438 460 90 82 83 84 
Bed 
Sheets 
P.000 1599 1808 1785 1817 100 100 100 100 
Towels  P.000 8897 7818 7950 8133 100 100 100 100 
Source: Owen calculations based on Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Statistical Abstract 2002-2005, Syrian Arab Republic. 
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However, the private sector dominates the garment industry and 
predominantly makes textile goods of synthetic and mixed yarns. 
Following the national promotional policy for the reinforcement of the 
private sector, the number of private companies has increased from 
15,619 in 1990 to more than 22,949 in 2004. Most of them are of small 
size with 1-9 employees. Yet, almost 91 companies employed more than 
50 employees in 2004 (Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), industrial 
statistics 2004). 
 The most important products of the textile sector in Syria are 
cotton yarns, cotton textiles and ready made clothes (see table 1). As can 
be seen from the table 1, the public sector dominates in yarn production, 
while the private sector is the only one active in tricot, bed sheets and 
towels. Both sectors produce cotton, woollen and synthetic textiles, 
underwear cloths, garment, carpet and stockings. 
Employment and labour costs 
According to official statistics, more than 101,000 employees worked in 
the T&C industry in 2002 (CBS, industrial statistics 2002). However, 
informal data as recorded by the SEBC (2003d) shows that the textile 
sector absorbs about 0.5 million workers, 70% of which work in the 
private sector. Syria has a relatively cheap labour force within the T&C 
sector, particularly in the labour intensive sub-sector, garments. The 
Syrian labour costs are estimated at 0.33 US$/hour within the industrial 
textile field (less than in Pakistan, China and India) and at 0.3 US$/hour 
in the clothing industry (similar to Bangladesh). The hourly wage for a 
Syrian worker in the cutting room in the garment industry averages 1.4 
US$/hour (Someya et. al. 2002: 14, SEBC 2003d: 58).  
 Nonetheless, wages in both the public and the private sector 
have increased substantially over the past five years. Data on wages in 
the public T&C companies show that the average monthly wages of 207 
dollars in 2002 increased to 252 dollars in 2005, i.e. by 21%. The results 
from our survey which was undertaken in March 2007 and included a 
questionnaire for 12 Syrian private T&C companies also illustrate that 
wages in the private sector increased considerably compared to 2002.6 In 
the surveyed companies, the average monthly wages were estimated at 
100-200 dollars for unskilled workers; 250-500 dollars for skilled 
workers and 400-600 dollars for trained cutters.  
 Labour productivity, in both private and public T&C 
companies, is relatively low. In the public enterprises this low 
productivity largely results from outdated machinery, excess number of 
employed workers and bureaucracy (Salmān 2005: 4). Workers in the 
private sector seem to lack good qualifications and training as well as 
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reliability (SEBC 2003a: 21-23). Low labour productivity and increasing 
labour costs will likely affect negatively the comparative advantages of 
Syrian T&C Industry. 
Trade performance  
Syria’s T&C exports, including raw cotton, made up an average of 31% 
of the non-oil exports and 10% of the entire exports in the period from 
2000 to 2006. Before 2006, the share of T&C exports witnessed a 
decline due to the increase in exports of ‘other goods’, such as food, 
beverages as well as livestock. In 2006, the share increased dramatically, 
indicating a positive development in the trade performance of the T&C 
industry during the same year7 (see figure 1). 
Figure 1: Share of T&C exports of total Syrian exports/non-oil exports 
1997-2006 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Summary of Foreign Trade 1997-2006, Syrian Arab Republic. 
Figure 2.a shows that the value of the T&C exports remained 
relatively constant between 1997 and 2005 with the exception of some 
fluctuations in 2002. However, the volume of both, exports and imports, 
fluctuated around a rising trend in the 1997-2005 period.  
In 2006, the export volume of T&C increased dramatically, reaching 
an average of 1200 tons p. a. (see figure 2.b).  
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Figure 2.a: Syria’s T&C exports 1997-2006 (million US$) 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Summary of Foreign Trade 1997-2006, Syrian Arab Republic. Note: 
US$ 1= SP 11.2 for exports and SP 11.25 for imports in 1997; from 
2000 to 2003, US$ 1 =SP 46 for exports and 46.5 for imports; since 
2004 US$ 1 = SP 48.65 for both exports and imports. 
Figure 2.b: Syria’s T&C exports 1997-2006 (in 1,000 tons) 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Summary of Foreign Trade 1997-2006, Syrian Arab Republic. 
 As shown by the export structure in figure 3, the list is headed 
by raw cotton and cotton yarns (Harmonized System (HS)8 52), which 
made up more than 50% of the entire T&C exports, followed by clothing 
(HS 60-63), which reached 38% in 2002. While textiles (HS 51, 53-59) 
and garment products had experienced an upward tendency since 2002, 
the share of cotton in the entire T&C exports dropped from 53% in 2005 
to 20% in 2006. However, this drop does not imply that the exports of 
raw cotton have decreased; instead it is caused by the large increase of 
garment exports for which prices are higher than for raw cotton. 
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Figure 3: Structure of Syrian T&C exports 1997-2006 (in percent) 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Summary of Foreign Trade 1997-2006, Syrian Arab Republic; UN 
com trade database, [http://comtrade.un.org/db/]. Percent 
calculated by the export values. 
This export structure reflects the comparative advantages of Syria 
within the T&C industry, in particular due to its production of cotton 
and the relatively low labour cost. On the other hand, this structure also 
indicates a gap within the value-added-chain of the Syrian T&C 
industry, whereby only the cotton textile industry has a completely local 
value chain (from raw material to final product). According to the 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) Index of Balassa, Syria has a 
comparative advantage in the production and trade of T&C goods, in 
particular for raw cotton, cotton yarns and knitted & crocheted 
commodities (see table 2). 
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 Table 2: Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA*) index  
of Syrian T&C industry 
SITC 
Rev. 
3 
Description RCA* 2000 HS Description 
RCA* 
2005 
26 
Textile fibres (other 
than wool tops and 
other combed wool) 
and their wastes (not 
manufactured into yarn 
or fabric) 
12.94 52 Cotton 10.07 
65 
Textile yarn, fabrics, 
made-up articles and 
related products 
1.28 54 Man-made fila-ments 2.54 
84 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 0.88 55 
Man-made staple 
fibres 0.47 
      61 Knitted or cro-cheted fabrics 1.2 
      62 
Articles of apparel 
and  
clothing accesso-
ries, not knitted or 
crocheted 
0.56 
      63 
Other made up 
textile articles; 
sets; worn clothing 
and worn textile 
articles 
0.7 
T&C   1.71     1.78 
* RCAij= (xijw/Txijw)/(xiw/TXw), whereby xijw = exports of country i 
from product j, xjw = world exports of product j, Txiw = total export 
of country i, TXw = total world exports. If the index RAC>1, means 
that the country i has a comparative advantage in the production 
and trade of this product. 
Source: own calculations based on UN Tradecom database 2000, 
2005, [http://comtrade.un.org/] 
Syria’s T&C exports by country/region  
The most important Syrian T&C export markets are GAFTA, EU, 
Turkey and Asia. While the EU was the main Syrian export market 
(43% of total T&C exports) in 1997, the foreign trade statistics show 
that, from 2004 onwards, GAFTA countries have been the most 
important importers of Syrian T&C goods (see table 3 and figure 4.a and 
4.b). 
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Table 3: Share of the main trading partners of total Syrian T&C exports 
1997, 2004 and 2006. 
Year Asia EU GAFTA Turkey 
1997 7% 43% 22% 9% 
2004 18% 28% 37% 10% 
2006 4% 23% 57% 6% 
Source: Own calculations, based on Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Summary of Foreign Trade 1997-2006, Syrian Arab Republic. 
Figure 4.a: Structure of Syrian T&C Exports by Trade Partner 2006  
(in percent) 
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Note: ROW for Rest of the World. 
Source: Own calculations, based on Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Summary of Foreign Trade 1997-2006, Syrian Arab Republic.  
Figure 4.b: Structure of Syrian T&C Exports by Trade Partner 2006  
(in percent) 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Asia EU GAFTA ROW Turkey
Structure of Syrian T&C Exports by Trade Partner 2006  
(in %)
Garment (60-63)
Textile
Cotton (HS 52)
 
Note: ROW for Rest of the World. Source: Own calculations, based 
on Central Bureau of Statistics, Summary of Foreign Trade 1997-
2006, Syrian Arab Republic.  
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Syrian T&C exports to the EU are mainly garment products and raw 
cotton. In 2006, the EU imported 26% of the total Syrian cotton exports 
and 30% of its garment exports. Syrian garment exports to the EU are 
mainly cotton clothes (T-shirts, cotton articles of clothing for women 
and children) as well as underwear. All these exports are normally set by 
direct orders for Syrian manufacturers from large European companies 
and well-known brands. By exporting in this way, Syrian T&C 
companies have no chance to market abroad either the name of Syria or 
the brand of the Syrian companies. Moreover, these production orders 
are not on a regular basis and comprise only a limited number of 
products.  
 As the figures above show, the share of the GAFTA region in 
the total Syrian T&C exports increased from 22% in 1997 (one year 
before the formation of GAFTA) to 57% in 2006 (one year after the 
formation of GAFTA). Syrian T&C exports to the GAFTA consist of 
garment products, raw cotton, cotton yarn as well as artificial and 
synthetic man-made filaments & fibres. Within GAFTA, Syria 
predominantly exports raw cotton and cotton yarn to Egypt, Tunisia and 
Morocco, where the T&C industry plays a key role in the economy. 
Syria mainly exports textile and garment products to those GAFTA 
members which have relatively lower competitive advantages in the 
textile industry, such as the Gulf countries and Libya. Most of Syrian 
garment exports to GAFTA are men and women suits, underwear, and 
clothes for children of both synthetic and cotton. Unlike on the 
European market, the Syrian T&C companies have a good chance to sell 
their products with their own designs and under their own label on the 
GAFTA market. This not only helps the companies to market their own 
brands, but also to support the image of Syrian textile industry abroad.  
 After the GAFTA and the EU, Turkey has become the third 
largest export market for Syria. In 2006, Turkey received 20%, 12% and 
8% of Syria’s garment, cotton and textile exports respectively. Also, it is 
expected that, due to the signing of the Syrian-Turkish free trade 
agreement in 2004 which came into force in January 2007, both Syrian 
T&C exports to Turkey and Turkish investments in the Syrian T&C 
sector will increase substantially.  
 Asian countries are among the world’s largest producers of 
T&C with a huge T&C industry of their own. For this reason their main 
import from Syria is raw cotton (HS 52) needed for their local T&C 
industry. However, their share has fallen from 50% in 2004 to 21% in 
2006. At present, the main Asian importers of Syrian cotton are Pakistan 
and China. 
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Syria’s T&C imports by country/region  
Imports to Syria of most T&C products are constrained by trade 
restrictions. Imports of all raw materials and of those finished products 
that are also produced locally are restricted through import bans or high 
custom duties. As a result of these restrictions, Syrian T&C imports 
consist mainly of textile products (HS 50-59) that are not produced in 
Syria and are used as inputs for the domestic industry. These products 
made up 93% and 83% of total T&C imports in 2004 and 2006 
respectively. Since the import ban on clothing products (HS 62-63) was 
abolished in 2006, it is expected that imports of garment products will 
increase dramatically in the coming years, especially from Asia.  
 As shown in table 4 and figure 5, Syrian T&C imports originate 
from Asia, the EU, Turkey and GAFTA.  
Table 4: Syrian T&C imports by country/region in 1997, 2004 and 2006 
  1997 2004 2006 
Asia 57% 64% 64% 
EU 12% 13% 17% 
Turkey 24% 7% 9% 
GAFTA 1% 7% 6% 
Source: Own calculations, based on Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Summary of Foreign Trade 1997-2006, Syrian Arab Republic. 
Figure 5: Syrian T&C Imports by Country/Region in 1997, 2004, 2006  
(in million US$) 
Note: US$ 1= SP 11.2 for exports and SP 11.25 for imports in 1997; 
from 2000 to 2003, US$ 1 =SP 46 for exports and 46.5 for imports; 
since 2004 US$ 1 = SP 48.65 for both exports and imports.  
Source: Own calculations, based on Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Summary of Foreign Trade 1997-2006, Syrian Arab Republic. 
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Olive Oil  
The agro-industrial olive oil sector plays an important role in the Syrian 
economy. Estimates based on the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) show that more than 377,000 families are involved in olive tree 
cultivation and olive oil production and marketing. This number 
constitutes around 15% of the entire Syrian labour force. The share of 
GDP of this sector has varied between 1.5 and 3.5% over the past years 
(Malevolti 2003). The olive oil industry has proved an important 
potential export sector for Syria since the end of the 1990s. Olive oil 
exports rose from 2,005 tons in 1997 to 20,000 tons in 2004 and 56,354 
in 2006 (which is 2% of the entire exports and 3% of the non-oil exports 
for 2006).  
 Starting in the mid-1980s, the government sought to increase 
the number of olive trees and extend the cultivated area. Under this 
agricultural policy, the number of olive trees increased from about 34 
thousand in 1986 to 63 million in 1999. In 2004, the number of olive 
trees reached 76 million, which includes 56 million trees that already 
bear fruit (see table 5). Syria expects to cultivate 2.5 million trees 
annually (Middle East Information and Communication Agency 
(MEICA) 2006a: 5). As a result, olive oil production has risen 
substantially over the past ten years. The International Olive Oil Council 
(IOOC), together with the SEBC, estimates that the Syrian olive oil 
production will reach approximately 275,000 tons by 2010 (SEBC 2004: 
52). 9  
Table 5: Production, consumption and exports of Syrian olive oil 
Season 
Olive 
trees* 
(total 
numbers) 
Cultivable 
Area* 
(in '000 
hectare) 
Production 
(in '000 
tons) 
Consumption 
(in '000 tons) 
Exports 
(in '000 
tons) 
1987/1988 35394 323,2 66 59 - 
1996/1997 59739 445,1 116 75,5 2 
2000/2001* 64 Mio. 478 165,3 104*** 10 
2004/2005 76 Mio. 531 175 135 35 
Source: Author’s compilation based on data from: 
International Olive Oil Council (IOOC) in MEICA (2006a), pp. 6-9; 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract 2005 and Ministry 
of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics 1997; Malevolti (2003) in FAO, 
[http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y4890e/y4890e00.htm#Contents]. 
The Case of Textile and Olive Oil Industry 47 
  
Today, Syria is one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of 
olive oil. Its share of the world production of olive oil has recently 
reached nearly 5%. Syria produces all kinds of olive oil, particularly 
Extra Virgin olive oil, which makes up almost 60% of the total 
production, while Fine Virgin olive oil constitutes another 32%. 
(MEICA 2006a: 5-6)  
Table 6: Production and exports of olive oil, 2004/2005 (in '000 Tons) 
 Syria  Turkey Italy Tunisia Spain Greece 
Production 175 145 750 110 990 430 
Exports  35 78 200 82 114 10 
Source: IOOC, in MEICA (2006a), p. 9. 
Company profiles 
In contrast to the T&C sector, the entire olive oil industry is managed by 
the Syrian private sector. In 2001, 813 olive oil mills were registered 
with the Syrian Ministry of Industry. Most of them are traditional, small-
size, locally oriented and family-managed firms. Furthermore, a large 
number of Syrian olive oil firms lack large, modern containers as well as 
effective marketing and logistics strategies.  
 Since the domestic production of olive oil grew more rapidly 
than its consumption, local producers have had to find new distribution 
channels, particularly for exports. Yet, access to foreign markets is 
proving to be difficult and presents serious challenges on its own. Apart 
from domestic suppliers’ lack of export experience, the export of Syrian 
olive oil is facing numerous other difficulties, e.g. problems in defining 
olive oil types and guaranteeing qualitative standards in accordance with 
international markets, inefficient management, limited logistics and 
transport capacities (Malevolti 2003, SEBC 2004: 52-3, MEICA 2006a: 
6-8). 
 Beyond that, the prices of Syrian olive oil have increased 
dramatically, despite the growth of production in recent years. For 
instance, in the year 2005 the price for 1 kg olive oil reached SP 160 
(US$ 3.8) in the domestic market, which equals a rise of 150% 
compared to the year before. The reasons for this substantial price 
increase are threefold: (a) a rise in production costs, in particular labour 
costs; (b) the growing volume of exports, which is putting increasing 
pressure on supply for the domestic market; and (c) the ban on imports 
of olive oil. (Malevolti 2003)  
48   Syrian Foreign Trade and Economic Reform 
  
Trade performance  
Until 2002, GAFTA represented the main export market for Syrian olive 
oil, with exports going to the Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
the United Arab Emirates) as well as to neighbouring Lebanon. 
However, the export figures of 2003 indicate a radical change, not only 
in respect to the export volume, but also to the export partners’ shares of 
total exports. The importance of the EU as an export market for Syrian 
olive oil has been increasing since 2002, reaching 80% and 64% in 2003 
and 2006 respectively. Although Italy and Spain are the world’s largest 
producers and exporters of olive oil, they also imported more than 
24,000 tons of olive oil from Syria in 2006 (see figure 6).  
Figure 6: Syrian exports of olive oil by country/region 1997-2006  
(in million US$) 
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Syrian exports of olive oil by country/region 1997-2006
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Note: US$ 1= SP 11.2 for exports and SP 11.25 for imports in 1997; 
from 2000 to 2003, US$ 1 =SP 46 for exports and 46.5 for imports; 
since 2004 US$ 1 = SP 48.65 for both exports and imports.  
Source: Own calculations based on Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Summary of Foreign Trade 1997-2006, Syrian Arab Republic: 
UNCTAD, Com Trade, 2005, [http://comtrade.un.org/]. 
 This considerable growth of olive oil exports to the EU is due to 
both the improved processing and managing performance of local olive 
oil firms, and the establishment of a number of Syrian-European joint 
ventures and foreign investments in this sector.10 These companies have 
large production and storage capacities, superior marketing skills, 
modern filtration and filling machinery and high production quality, all 
of which enables them to meet the European quality standards. Currently 
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these companies are responsible for more than 50% of the total Syrian 
olive oil exports. (SEBC 2003e: 24, MEICA 2006a: 8-9).  
Table 7: The most important olive oil export partners for Syria in share 
of total olive oil exports (1997-2006) 
 EU* GAFTA Turkey USA Rest of World 
1997 0% 97% 0% 0% 0% 
2001 0% 80% 5% 6% 4% 
2002 17% 55% 24% 1% 3% 
2003 80% 14% 2% 1% 3% 
2004 68% 17% 0% 3% 11% 
2005 73% 10% 2% 2% 12% 
2006 64% 23% 0% 4% 8% 
* The most important European importers are Italy and Spain; their 
share has constituted more than 97% of the entire European Union 
imported goods from Syria since 2003.  
Source: Own calculations based on Central Bureau of Statistics, 
Summary of Foreign Trade 1997-2006, Syrian Arab Republic: 
UNCTAD, Com Trade, 2005, [http://comtrade.un.org/]. 
 However, the improvements in product quality, marketing and 
management of the olive oil companies that are operating in Syria are 
not the only reason for the increasing exports into the highly protected 
EU olive oil market. In fact, the EU applies a new trade regulation since 
2000, called the "inward processing arrangement", according to which 
European producers are allowed to import unlimited amounts of olive 
oil from non-member countries to the EU under the condition that they 
export the same quantity of olive oil. Such arrangements are normally 
used by the European companies to satisfy the growing domestic and 
international demand for their products (Karray 2004: 8-9). Under these 
regulations, European companies can only import unprocessed olive oil. 
The olive oil is then refined, packaged and marketed in the EU and/or 
re-exported as a "European" product. As a consequence, no Syrian olive 
oil is sold through wholesale channels in the EU, and no Syrian branded 
products will be found in European supermarkets. This arrangement 
certainly represents a good opportunity for Syrian olive oil producers to 
export successfully. However, it prevents them from receiving high 
profit rates by selling high-value-added-products.11 Consequently, 
GAFTA represents, despite its limited market size, a more promising 
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export market for Syrian olive oil, when compared to the EU, because 
Syrian companies can sell their branded olive oil products there and 
create an image for Syrian olive oil. The most attractive target markets 
within GAFTA are the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
and the United Arab Emirates, where not only Arabic and Syrian 
consumers live, but also people from other countries (Malevolti 2003, 
MEICAa 2006: 9). 
Trade Liberalization in Syria 
Unilateral Measures of Trade Liberalization 
The Syrian trade regime has been described by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) as “one of the most restrictive trade regimes in 
the world”. Until the early 2000s, trade restrictions included high tariff 
rates, import prohibitions for a large number of goods, public sector 
trade monopolies as well as import licensing requirements. In addition, 
foreign exchange policy reinforced trade restrictions and increased 
transaction costs dramatically, since it adopted a system of multiple 
exchange rates. The restrictive measures were further intensified by 
unclear customs procedures, which led to time-consuming clearances, a 
lack of transparency and corruption (IMF 2006: 43-52, Zarrouk 2003: 
53-57).  
 The prime objective of this restrictive foreign trade policy was 
to protect domestic production and to stimulate import-substitutive 
industries. This can be seen clearly in the relatively low trade barriers on 
raw materials, preliminary products and capital goods, as opposed to 
those applied to consumer and luxury goods. Before 2002, import duties 
were very high in Syria, and they consisted of several different taxes at 
the border including custom duties, statistical fees and foreign trade tax. 
The custom duties reached an average of up to 255% and spread over 20 
categories (IMF 2006: 44).  
 Since 2004, Syria has been striving to reduce customs duties as 
well as to eliminate several non-tariff barriers. The number of imports 
prohibited for protection purposes has been reduced gradually and in 
2006 import prohibitions were eliminated also for sensitive sectors like 
textile and cement. Apart from that, public import monopolies on some 
consumer goods like cars were lifted, and import licensing for raw 
materials was abolished. Export license requirements were replaced by a 
statistical form, while export bans (except for seasonal agricultural 
products and specific taxes and fees) were eliminated (IMF 2006: 45-
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49). In February 2008, the Syrian government significantly reduced the 
list of prohibited goods.  
Despite these efforts to remove non-tariff barriers in the past four 
years, trade regulations and non-tariff barriers in Syria remain complex 
and unclear, and their impact on the cost of imports can exceed 
substantially that of tariffs.  
 Both the T&C industry and the sub-sector of olive oil were, and 
still are, highly protected by tariff and non-tariff barriers. After all, their 
backward linkages with the agro-industrial sectors (cotton, olives) and 
their prominent share in the industrial working force put them among the 
most "sensitive" economic sectors in Syria. The customs tariff on the 
T&C products varied between 1% and 132% until 2003. The lowest rate 
of duty (1%) was applied only on raw materials such as wool, synthetic 
yarn and filament and mixed webs, which are not produced in Syria. The 
highest tariffs (71%, 102%, 132%) were applied to imports of clothing 
(HS 60-63) and carpets (HS 57). Fabrics and textiles (HS 53-59) had 
different customs tariffs and varied between 7-47%. To this day, imports 
of raw cotton as well as cotton yarns and textiles are forbidden 
altogether due to the government monopoly in the cotton sector. In 
2005, the highest duty rate for T&C imports was reduced to 50%, and 
one year later, the ban on imports of apparel and clothing accessories, 
knitted or non-knitted (HS 61-62) was lifted (see table 8). In addition, 
the T&C sector in Syria is protected by non-tariff restrictions, such as 
import bans and import licenses. The Word Bank estimated the tariff 
equivalent of qualitative barriers for textile products in Syria at 120.1% 
in 2004, ranking among the highest protected goods after Tobacco and 
plastic (Femise 2006: 103-105). 
 In the olive oil sector, both imports and exports were forbidden 
until 1997. The ban on exports was attributed to two prime reasons: (a) 
to satisfy domestic demand; and (b) to control olive oil prices in the 
domestic market. Additionally, the ban on imports of olive oil was 
supposed to protect the domestic olive oil industry against foreign 
suppliers. In 1997, Syria abolished the ban on olive oil exports and 
replaced it with different export restrictions (export quota and/or 
permission). Starting in 2007, olive oil imports were permitted from 
GAFTA member countries only. However, imports of olive oil from 
other countries are still banned. Customs regulations would apply a rate 
of duty of 29% to olive oil products (HS 1509) if the import bans were 
to be lifted.12 
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Table 8: Customs tariff and prohibited T&C imports in Syria 
 HS code 
tariff 
rate  
2003 
tariff 
rate 
2005* 
Import Prohibitions 
2006 2008 
50 Silk 7-71% 1-5% 
5001-
5005, 
5007 
5001-
5005 
51 
Wool, Fine Or Coarse Ani-
mal Hair; Horsehair Yarn 
and Woven Fabric 
23.5%
-47% 1-%5 
5111-
5113 
no prohi-
bition 
52 Cotton 23.5%-71% 
3,5-
14,5% 
5201-
5206 
5201-
5206 
53 
Other Vegetable Textile 
Fibres; Paper Yarn and Wo-
ven Fabrics of Paper Yarn 
1-29% 1-10% 5302 5302 
54 Man-made Filaments 1,7-47% 
1-
14,5% 
5401, 
5404-
5408 
5401, 
5404-
5405 
55 Man-made Staple Fibres 1%-45% 
1-
14,5% 
5508-
5516 
no prohi-
bition 
56 
Wadding, Felt and 
Nonwovens; Special Yarns; 
Twine, Cordage, Ropes and 
Cables and Articles Thereof 
7%-
102% 5-50% 
5601, 
560500
40, 
5606-
5609 
56050040
, 5606-
5607 
57 Carpets and Other Textile Floor Coverings 
47-
102%  
(23.5
%, 
7%)* 
50%  
(1%, 
10%)* 
5701-
5703, 
5705 
5701-
5703, 
5705 
From 
2007 
allowed 
for 
GAFTA 
members 
only 
58 
Special Woven Fabrics; 
Tufted Textile Fabrics; Lace; 
Tapestries; Trimmings; Em-
broidery 
23.5-
71% 1-29% 
5803, 
5805-
5810 
5810 
59 
Impregnated, Coated, Cov-
ered Or Laminated Textile 
Fabrics, Textiles Articles Of 
A Kind Suitable for Industrial 
Use 
1,7-
47% 1-50% 
5903, 
5905, 
5908, 
5911 
5911 
60 Knitted Or Crocheted Fab-rics 7-71% 
10-
14,5% - 
no prohi-
bition 
61 
Articles of Apparel and 
Clothing Accessories, Knit-
ted Or Crocheted 
29-
102% 7-50% 
se-
cond-
hand 
cloths 
second-
hand  
cloths 
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62 
Articles of Apparel and 
Clothing Accessories, Not 
Knitted Or Crocheted 
47-
102% 
(7%) 
29%-
50% 
(1.7%) 
se-
cond-
hand 
cloths s 
second-
hand  
cloths 
63 
Other Made Up Textile Arti-
cles; Sets; Worn Clothing 
and Worn Textile Articles; 
Rags 
47-
132% 
(23.5) 
1,7-
50% 
6301 to 
6310 6310 
* This tariff rate is still valid. 
** There are only some goods in the category (HS 57) whose tariff 
rate is at 1% or 10%. Most of the carpet and floor covering goods 
have a higher tariff (50%). 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Ministry of Finance, Syrian 
Customs, Customs tariff Agenda in 2003; Ministry of Finance, 
Decree No. 357, dated 20.08.2007, 
[http://www.syrianfinance.org/ara/article/788.htm], accessed 25 
March 2008; Ministry of Economy & Trade, Negative List, of 
30.05.2006, and 25.02.2008, 
[http://www.syrecon.gov.sy/servers/media/20080302-033900.pdf], 
accessed 25 March 2008;  
Ministry of Economy & Trade, Decree No. 338, dated 18.02.2007, 
[http://www.syrecon.org/index.php?module=subjects&func=viewpag
e&pageid=524], accessed 29 September 2008. 
Trade Agreements with Neighbouring Countries 
Besides the regional free trade agreement with the Arab States, GAFTA, 
Syria has signed free trade agreements on a bilateral basis with Lebanon 
in 1998, Jordan in 2002 and Turkey in 2004 among others (see table 9). 
In addition, the Syrian European Association Agreement has been 
initialled in 2004. 
 Restrictions on T&C imports were to be further reduced by 
these agreements. The tariffs on T&C goods from GAFTA member 
countries were supposed to be completely eliminated in 2005. 
According to the Turkish Syrian Free Trade Agreement, all import 
tariffs on Turkish T&C products are to be lifted gradually over a 
transition period of twelve years starting in 2007. Similarly, the tariffs 
on European T&C products are also expected to reach zero over twelve 
years as soon as the Syrian European Association Agreement comes into 
effect.  
 As stated before, imports of olive oil are generally banned. It 
seems that this import ban is still also applied for GAFTA members, 
despite the official implementation of GAFTA in 2005.13 Moreover, 
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olive oil is not included in the liberalized sectors in the free trade 
agreements either with Turkey or with the EU (see Ministry of Economy 
& Trade 2004, and European Commission 2004). 
Table 9: Selected Free Trade Agreements of Syria (1997-2007) 
Country/Region Signed in force 
zero tariff rate/  
launch of free trade area 
GAFTA 1997 1998 2005 
Lebanon 1998 1999 2004  
United Arab Emir-
ates 
2000 2001 2003 
Qatar 2000 2001 2003 
Saudi-Arabia 2001 2002 2003 
Jordan 2002 2002 2005 
Turkey 2004 2007 
12-year transition period  
from 2007 
Source: Author’s compilation based on: SEBC (2003b), p. 13-20, 
Ministry of Economy & Trade, Syria, 
[http://www.syrecon.gov.sy/servers/gallery/20060907-103140.pdf]. 
 Despite the progress that has been made regarding trade 
liberalization in Syria, many trade barriers continue to restrict full trade 
liberalization not only with the rest of world, but also with those trading 
partners with whom Syria has signed free trade agreements, such as 
Turkey and GAFTA members. Firstly, the negative list of imports is still 
relatively long and includes a large number of T&C products as well as 
all types of olive oil. Secondly, the tariff rate on T&C imported goods 
remains high (up to 50%14) and it spreads over nine categories. Thirdly, 
the government still monopolizes trading in the basic sub-sector of the 
T&C industry, i.e. cotton.  
The Greater Arab Free Trade Area 
The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) was established by the 
Arab League’s Economic and Social Council in 1997 and came into 
force in 1998. By the end of 2007, 1715 of the 22 members of the Arab 
League had joined GAFTA. GAFTA aims to strengthen the inter-Arab 
trade and to launch a free trade area among its member countries. 
Accordingly, all tariffs and other charges on Arab goods were to be 
eliminated gradually over a period of ten years.16 In 2001, the Economic 
and Social Council, which is the institutional framework of GAFTA, 
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decided to accelerate the establishment of GAFTA and to reach zero-
percent tariffs by the beginning of the year 2005 (Zorob 2006: 110-
114).17 The GAFTA Executive Programme allows the members to draw 
up a list of exemptions (a negative list) from tariff reductions for 
industrial goods during the first years of the agreement, but only for a 
specified period of a maximum of three years. The total number of 
goods which were requested to be exempted in 1998 reached 832 
commodities, representing 14% of the total commodities. Six Arab 
countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia) 
submitted negative lists, which included textile products.18 These 
exemptions had to be removed by September 2002; however, the 
negative lists have not been abolished, at least not in Egypt, Tunisia, 
Syria and Morocco (Affifi 2005: 3-11). In addition, these countries have 
added administrative procedures, especially for textile products, to 
protect their domestic industries. Agricultural goods under this 
agreement should also have been liberalized by 2005. Each member was 
allowed to submit a list of ten products to be excluded during the peak 
harvest seasons with a maximum total exemption for all named products 
of 45 months, which in 2001 was reduced to 35 months (Chemingui & 
Marouani 2006: 10-11).  
 Nevertheless, GAFTA has not been able to eliminate the 
various forms of non-tariff barriers obstructing intra-Arab trade 
covering, among others, import bans. Also, GAFTA has not yet drawn 
up an agreement on the detailed rules of origin, which will probably 
interfere with any deflection of trade.19 Without such an agreement, 
many member countries continue to apply high trade restrictions in 
order to a avoid trade deflections. In fact, this assumption is used 
typically to justify their unwillingness to fully open their markets to the 
other members (For more details about the implementation of GAFTA 
see ESCWA 2001, ESCWA 2006).  
 Currently, GAFTA represents a market with approximately 263 
million inhabitants and with a GDP of 961 billion dollars. The GDP per 
capita averaged out at US$ 3,500-4,000 in 2005. GAFTA constitutes 
almost 97% of the inter-Arab foreign trade and data from the Arab 
Monetary fund shows that the share of interregional trade in the entire 
foreign trade of GAFTA member countries increased from 8.5% in 1998 
to only 10.8% in 2006. Since more than 70% of the interregional trade 
consists of crude oil and petroleum products, the share of the 
interregional trade rises to 20% if one takes the petroleum out of the 
foreign trade data (Abū Alnnaer 2007: 9-11). Interregional trade remains 
modest and lower than expected by the architects of GAFTA. Moreover, 
most interregional trade within GAFTA flows between neighbouring 
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countries. Also, the relevance of GAFTA countries as potential trade 
partners is not the same for all GAFTA member countries. For instance, 
GAFTA is regarded as a promising export market for Syria. However, 
compared with the EU and USA, GAFTA represents a rather limited 
market for other countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco (see 
table 10). 
Table 10: Ratio of intraregional trade to foreign trade in the Arab 
countries, 1998-2005 (in percent) 
 
Sources: ESCWA, based on IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 
Yearbook 2005; and IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Quarterly, 
September 2006, in ESCWA 2006, p. 27, Table 11 
The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Textile and Olive Oil 
Industries in Syria 
As a result of tariff reduction on both unilateral and regional levels the 
total imports of T&C and olive oil to Syria have increased since 1997 
(see figures 1-6). The unilateral tariff reduction undertaken in 2004 and 
2006, however, only increased the trade in liberalized goods, but not 
those with import bans.  
 Tariff reduction usually has a negative effect on budgetary 
revenues due to declining customs duties. In the case of Syria, however, 
both the import tax revenue, including customs duties, statistical fees 
and foreign trade tax, and its share in the GDP have increased between 
1997 and 2004. According to the IMF, import tax revenues as a share of 
GDP increased from an average of only 1.6% in 2000 to 2.53% in 2004 
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(IMF 2005: 28-9, IMF 2006: 44). This results from the replacement of 
import bans on many goods by customs duties. It is hence to be expected 
that import tax revenues will increase as long as Syria continues this 
practice.  
 Among the most important effects of trade liberalization on the 
Syrian textile and olive oil industries is the exposure of companies that 
have long enjoyed trade protection against tougher (foreign) 
competition. In principle, inefficient domestic companies will close 
down and those surviving will be forced to improve their productivity 
and efficiency. In addition, enhanced competition will also contribute to 
reducing monopoly profits and prices on the Syrian market (Zorob 2006: 
169).  
 In contrast to unilateral trade liberalization, bilateral and 
regional free trade agreements will not only enhance competition and 
affect the budgetary revenues due to the elimination of trade barriers. In 
addition, the market enlargement would open up new opportunities for 
efficient producers from member countries to boost their exports and to 
benefit from economies of scale. As stated before, Syria has signed 
several free trade agreements since 1997. The Association Agreement 
with the EU has so far only been initialled and the Turkish-Syrian free 
trade Area has recently come (2007) into effect. Both agreements are 
concluded on a bilateral level. By contrast, GAFTA is the first and the 
only valid Free Trade Area on a regional level with a long-term 
objective to promote regional economic integration between the member 
countries. For this reason, the following parts of this paper will focus on 
the impact of the GAFTA on the Syrian T&C and olive oil industries. 
 According to the theory of regional economic integration, the 
establishment of GAFTA is likely to have static and dynamic welfare 
effects on the member countries (Viner 1950, Balassa 1973, Baldwin & 
Venables 1995, El-Agraa 1999 and Robson 1998). These effects result 
from the changed competitive conditions due to the elimination of tariffs 
on imports from member countries and an increased size of the market. 
The static effects, namely trade creation and trade diversion20, are 
expected to further intra-regional trade between GAFTA members. The 
dynamic effects of GAFTA, which are e.g. economies of scale, 
competition effects and learning effects, will (a) increase the efficiency 
of the competing industries in the GAFTA region in accordance with the 
principle of comparative advantages; (b) lead to a more efficient 
reallocation of resources (labour and capital) within the GAFTA region; 
and (c) encourage specialization and greater diversity in the companies 
(Balassa 1973 El-Agraa 1999: Chapter 3 and 5). To summarise, both 
static and dynamic effects of GAFTA on the Syrian T&C and olive oil 
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industries are expected to result in: firstly, increasing trade between 
Syria and GAFTA-members, secondly, enhancing competition on the 
Syrian market and, thirdly, improving the economies of scale and 
learning effects for Syrian companies as a result of the market 
enlargement. 
 The T&C- and olive oil trade between Syria and the GAFTA 
member countries has indeed grown after coming into force of the 
GAFTA, as can be seen in Table 11: 
Table 11: T&C-and olive oil trade between Syria and the GAFTA 
member countries in 1997, 2004 and 2006 
 1997 2004 2006 
Tariff reduction in the framework of GAFTA  - 80% 100% 
T&C exports to GAFTA 
Value (million US$*) 117.7 169.2 1018.2 
in percent of total T&C exports 22% 37% 57% 
T&C imports from GAFTA 
Value (million US$*) 3.8 32.3 26.9 
in percent of total T&C imports 1% 7% 6% 
Olive oil exports to 
GAFTA 
Value (million US$*) 5.50 5.99 39.83 
in percent of total olive oil ex-
ports 
97% 17% 23% 
Olive oil imports from 
GAFTA 
import bans on olive oil imports    
* Note: US$ 1= SP 11.2 for exports and SP 11.25 for imports in 
1997; from 2000 to 2003, US$ 1 =SP 46 for exports and 46.5 for 
imports; since 2004 US$ 1 = SP 48.65 for both exports and imports.  
Source: Own calculations, Central Bureau of Statistics, Summary of 
Foreign Trade 1997-2006, Syrian Arab Republic.  
 This growth in trade with the GAFTA members is, however, not 
only due to the establishment of GAFTA. More important causes are the 
government’s economic reforms and the improvement of the marketing 
skills of domestic companies in Syria. This assumption21 is based on 
four reasons: (a) The elimination of trade barriers in the framework of 
GAFTA is not completely implemented for T&C products and olive oil 
either in Syria or in many of the other GAFTA member countries, 
including Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan 
(ESCWA 2006: 51-55); (b) The destination of Syrian T&C and olive oil 
exports inside GAFTA have not changed after GAFTA was established. 
The Gulf countries, which applied low average tariffs even before the 
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formation of GAFTA remain the most important export markets for 
Syria; (c) After eliminating tariffs on imports from GAFTA member 
countries in 2005, a large number of tariff barriers were replaced by 
non-tariff barriers in order to protect key domestic industries. T&C is 
among the most important industrials branches, not only in Syria, but 
also in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan. Various kinds of non-tariff 
barriers impede any significant increase in the T&C trade between those 
countries despite the GAFTA agreement (ESCWA 2006: 52); (d) the 
growing trade between Syria and members of GAFTA was driven by 
increased exports, not imports, with T&C imports from GAFTA 
members remaining very low compared with those from Asian 
countries, which have been Syria’s main import partners for textiles in 
recent years (see Section 2.1 and 2.2). This is, probably, because of both 
the protectionist trade policy in Syria and the relatively high production 
costs in the other member countries compared with those in Syria and in 
Asian countries. Moreover, Syrian T&C companies claim that most 
T&C products imported from GAFTA into Syria over the past years are 
actually Asian products that have come in via the Gulf countries, where 
import duties are very low (Hamdan, Haj-Ibrahim and Ismael 2005: 28-
34). This deflection of trade, the authors argue, is a result of the absence 
of effective rules of origin in GAFTA. In addition, almost all GAFTA 
member countries have pursued economic reforms, including trade 
liberalization. Starting in the mid-1990s, many of them have begun 
unilateral trade liberalization programmes, signed reciprocal free trade 
agreements (bilateral and/or regional), or joined the World trade 
Organization (Hoekman, Kheir-El-Din 2000: 1-3). This market opening 
of GAFTA members has eroded trade advantages for GAFTA members 
compared to non-members. Consequently, T&C producers from 
GAFTA face growing competition not only from suppliers from other 
GAFTA members, but also from non-members. Hence GAFTA, per se, 
cannot be credited with having substantially increased inter-Arab trade.  
 As for future prospects of GAFTA, one problem is that the 
T&C trade between Syria and GAFTA members is complementary 
rather than competitive trade. All countries that produce similar T&C 
commodities import only raw materials needed for local industry from 
each other in order to avoid any competition. Besides, some GAFTA 
members like Jordan have recently begun to establish their own T&C 
industry which is highly protected. Consequently, the trade of T&C 
commodities for final consumption will probably not increase between 
Syria and the T&C producing countries Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and 
Jordan, despite the establishment of GAFTA. It seems, therefore, that 
the only way to promote trade between these member countries is to 
60   Syrian Foreign Trade and Economic Reform 
  
intensify the intra-regional economic linkages between them, e.g. by 
direct investments, business co-operation, joint business ventures etc. 
Such co-operation will at least increase the intra-company trade, which 
could become an important component of the trade flows between these 
countries.  
 At the same time, these countries are forced by domestic 
economic reforms and their WTO commitments to open their T&C 
market for Asian countries, which are the world's most competitive 
countries in production and export of textiles. According to the 
viewpoint of representatives from the Chambers of Industry and 
Commerce in Damascus, Aleppo and Cairo,22 the most threatening 
competition for the T&C domestic and export markets in Syria and 
Egypt comes from the textile imports of Asian origin, in particular from 
China. It is therefore astonishing that they still fear competition among 
themselves. 
 As regards Syria, despite the formation of GAFTA in 2005, 
competition from GAFTA members is still restricted on the Syrian T&C 
market. This basically results from import bans, other non-tariff barriers 
and domestic monopolies in the hands of businesses or those close to the 
Syrian political elite. Until 2007, the toughest competition on the Syrian 
T&C market has come from the low cost Asian T&C products and in 
part from Turkish and European fashion- and high quality textile 
products. The clothing merchants in Damascus estimated the share of 
foreign clothing commodities at 60% in 2007 (Baridi 2007: 22-25). 
After the import bans on apparel and clothing had been lifted in 2006, 
the competitive ready made clothing of Asian origin forced many 
garment manufactures in Syria either to close or to outsource their 
production to more efficient firms (Hamdan, Haj-Ibrahim and Ismael 
2005: 28-34). If one takes the rising production cost and relatively low 
labor productivity in the Syrian T&C industry into account, Syrian T&C 
products will be less competitive and more affected by the market 
opening. The Syrian garment industry, which is labor intensive, will lose 
its comparative advantages, since there is no significant improvement in 
productivity and efficiency in this industry (SEBC 2003d: 10-11, 56-59). 
The competition by Turkish products is so far limited to the quality-
oriented market segment. Yet, the competition from Turkey will 
probably increase dramatically over the next years if the Syrian-Turkish 
Free Trade Agreement will really be implemented as scheduled. 
Accordingly, unilateral trade liberalization had more pronounced effects 
on competition on the Syrian market than GAFTA. 
 Similar to the T&C trade, Syrian olive oil as a “final product”23 
is exported predominantly to the Gulf countries. Countries producing 
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olive oil within the GAFTA region, such as Tunisia Morocco, Jordan 
and Lebanon, are still protecting their domestic olive oil industry. 
Hence, it is unlikely that the GAFTA export markets for Syrian olive oil 
will be expanded due to the GAFTA agreement without setting up an 
intra-regional business co-operation in olive oil production between 
Syria and the other olive oil producing countries. The Syrian domestic 
olive oil market is still completely closed to foreign competition 
although Syria has a comparative advantage in producing and exporting 
olive oil (see figure 6). Thus, there are so far no competition effects due 
to GAFTA or to the unilateral trade liberalization on the Syrian olive oil 
industry.  
 A further potentially important impact of GAFTA on the Syrian 
industries represents the economies of scale and learning effects of the 
market enlargement created by GAFTA. However the ability of Syrian 
companies to benefit from these opportunities seems to have been quite 
limited so far. First of all, GAFTA members, including some of the Gulf 
countries like Saudi-Arabia, Oman and Kuwait, have not fully opened 
their T&C- and olive markets for Syrian producers. In addition, Arab 
goods traded among the GAFTA members are subject to discriminatory 
treatment in Arab markets (see ESCWA 2006: 50-53). Syrian textile 
products gained access to these markets rather due to unilateral trade 
liberalization than to the implementation of GAFTA. The Syrian share 
in the T&C and olive oil market of the Gulf countries depends on the 
competitiveness of Syrian firms, since the competition of the non-
GAFTA competition from Asian countries, the EU and Turkey, on the 
markets of these countries is very high. The Syrian share in the Gulf 
markets is driven mainly by the demand of Syrian and Arab guest-
workers. The quality- and brand-oriented market in the Gulf countries is 
dominated by European suppliers, and the price-oriented market by the 
Asians. Under these circumstances, Syrian T&C suppliers have limited 
opportunities to increase their market share in the GAFTA member 
countries. Furthermore, a large number of the existing private Syrian 
textile companies are small to medium size and have a limited 
production capacity. Accordingly, they are not able to adjust their 
manufacturing equipments in order to take advantage of economies of 
scale offered by GAFTA, even in the long term.  
By contrast, the improvement in the production capacity and 
marketing experience of Syrian olive oil companies allows them to 
benefit from economies of scale. However, despite Syria’s rising share 
in the GAFTA’s olive oil market, the economies of scale effects are 
mainly driven by its even higher and steadily increasing share in the 
European olive oil market.  
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 Conclusion 
The main aim of this paper was to examine the impact of trade 
liberalization in line with the GAFTA Free Trade Area on two Syrian 
industries, namely Textile and Olive oil since 1997. As a result of the 
unilateral measures of trade liberalization starting in 2004, the 
competition on the Syrian textile market has increased, especially from 
Asian, Turkish and European ready made clothing. Competitive 
companies gained from tariff reduction on imported inputs for the T&C 
industry with the effect that their costs could be reduced and profit 
margins increased. In contrast, the Syrian olive oil market is still 
completely protected by import bans against foreign competition.  
 As GAFTA has not yet been fully implemented neither in Syria 
nor in other member countries, the increasing T&C and olive oil trade 
between Syria and GAFTA members is a consequence of the unilateral 
trade liberalization programs that were recently undertaken in GAFTA 
member countries, including Syria, rather than the effect of the GAFTA 
agreement itself. Despite the comparative advantages of Syria in textiles 
and olive oil production, Syrian companies will not be able to benefit 
from economies of scale effects due to the market expansion of GAFTA 
until the market in member countries will be opened up completely for 
Syrian products by full implementation of GAFTA targets. Similar to 
other members of GAFTA, the Syrian market is still protected by 
various non-tariff barriers against suppliers within the free trade area. 
So, the effects of competition on the Syrian T&C and olive oil industries 
due to GAFTA are limited.  
 Nevertheless, the GAFTA market has become more relevant for 
Syrian clothing and olive oil exports since 2004. Compared with the 
European market, Syrian T&C and olive oil companies have a better 
chance to establish their own brand on the GAFTA market. The 
potential to export into this region depends, however, on the 
implementation of GAFTA. The more trade barriers are lifted between 
member countries the more joint ventures or intra-regional investments 
will be generated in the GAFTA region and the greater the export 
potential for Syrian companies. However, given the current political and 
economic circumstances in GAFTA member countries, it is unlikely that 
GAFTA will lead to extensive trade among its members without further 
intra-regional economic integration, such as direct investments, business 
co-operations, or joint business ventures. 
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1 The average shares are own calculations based on the national foreign 
trade statistics of Syria; non-oil exports are defined as the entire exports minus 
crude oil exports (HS 27). Raw cotton and cotton yarn (HS 52) account for 50-
60% of the entire T&C exports of Syria. Accordingly, T&C exports, excluding 
raw cotton and cotton yam, represent no more than 13% to 15% of non-oil 
exports.  
2 The cotton policy incorporates numerous facilities (subsidies) to cotton 
farmers, such as cash credits and/or material support (seed, fertilizer ... etc.). See 
Khoury, (not stated), p. 77. 
3 Cotton Ginning and Marketing Organization is an autonomous 
government institution established by presidential decree number 106 in 1965. 
See Cotton Marketing Organization, www.cmo.gov.sy. 
4 The difference between the purchase price and the international price are 
a national support scheme for farmers, which is financed by the public 
Agricultural Bank. This subsidy is estimated to amount to 1.3% of GDP in 2004 
and 1.1% in 2005. More details see IMF (2006), pp. 55-57. 
5 There are only two public enterprises that have less than 400 employees. 
6 A copy of the questionnaire and more details about the survey may be 
obtained upon request from the author at said@uni-bremen.de.  
7 The official Foreign Trade Statistics of Syria (CBS) for 2005 show that 
the category “goods with passengers” constituted approx. 27% of the total 
exports and 59% the non-oil exports. In an interview with Abdallah Dardari 
(Syria's Deputy Prime Minister of Economic Affairs) in Damascus in March 
2007, he explained that the foreign trade statistics of 2005 are not absolutely 
accurate and that T&C exports as reported by the Chamber of Commerce 
exceeded those of CBS in the same year. Accordingly, CBS took into account 
the export data of the Chamber of Commerce, starting 2005; this explains the 
jump in export figures of the T&C products in 2006 compared to the year 
before. 
8 The Harmonized System (HS) is a commodity classification system in 
which articles are grouped largely according to the nature of the materials of 
which they are made, as has been traditional in customs nomenclatures. The HS 
is intended to serve as a universally accepted classification system for goods, so 
that countries can administer customs programmes and collect trade data on 
exports and imports.  
9 This estimation is based on the following assumptions: The annual growth 
rate of olive trees is 2.76%; the coefficient of elasticity amounts to 0.4; the pro 
capita consumption is 5.4 kg and additional 23 million so far fruitless olive trees 
will carry fruits until then. See Malevolti (2003) and SEBC (2004).  
10 Among the most important olive oil enterprises that have been 
established in Syria since 2001, are the Spanish-Saudi Arabian company "The 
East Mediterranean olive oil company" (EMOC) and the Syrian-Swiss company 
"Near East olive products" (NEOP). EMOC was established by a big Spanish 
olive oil company “Aceites del Sur“ and the Saudi Binladin Group in 2001 and 
took up business in 2003. See EMOC, [http://www.emocsyria.com/]. NEOP was 
established in 2002 and is owned at 80% by a Swiss company (FPM SA); see 
NEOP, [http://www.sebcsyria.org/oliveoil/co40.htm]. 
11 Syrian olive oil exporting companies estimated an average profit rate of 
15% if the olive oil is exported as a product for end consumption, compared to 
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5%, if it is exported unprocessed in bulk. This was one of the results of a survey 
undertaken by the author in March 2007, including a questionnaire filled out by 
eight Syrian olive oil companies. A copy of the questionnaire and more details 
on the results of this survey may be obtained upon request from the author at 
said@uni-bremen.de.  
12 The olive oil types (HS 1509.10.21) and (HS 1509.90.21) have tariff 
rates of 7% and 20%, respectively.  13	  Only in 2007, Syria lifted prohibition on olive oil import from GAFTA 
members, see Ministry of Economy & Trade, Decree No. 338, 
[http://www.syrecon.org/index.php?module=subjects&func=viewpage&pageid=
524], accessed 29 September 2008. 
14 More than 35% of the T&C products have a duty rate of 50%, which 
covers the HS codes 56 to 63; see the customs duties of 2007 in: Ministry of 
Finance, www.syrianfinance.org/ara/article/80-sub.htm. 
15 GAFTA members are Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Membership is open to all members of the 
Arab League.  
16 See League of Arab States, Executive Program of Agreement to 
Facilitate and Develop Trade Among Arab Countries (1997).  
17 The annual tariff reduction was 20% in the last two years. By 2004, the 
trade tariff reduction among GAFTA members reached 80%. 
18 See League of Arab States, Trade and Development Department, 
Economic and Social Council, Decision No. 1381, 1999, about exemptions 
applied within GAFTA. 
19 According to Balassa, deflection of trade occurs when imports from non-
members come via another member country with a lower tariff rate thus 
exploiting the duty-free access to other members of the Free Trade Area. Most 
Free Trade Areas adopt “rules of origin” to limit trade deflection. See Balassa 
(1962), in El-Agraa (1982), pp. 22-3.  
20 Trade creation occurs when expensive domestic products are replaced by 
cheaper imports from another member of the Free Trade Area. By contrast, 
trade diversion is the replacement of more efficient, or cheaper, producers from 
the rest of the world by imports from a higher cost or less efficient producer 
from the Free Trade Area. Accordingly, the welfare gains of members of a Free 
Trade Area arise when the welfare-improving trade creation effects exceed 
welfare-reducing trade diversion effects, see Viner 1950. 
21 This assumption is based on (a) the findings of a survey conducted by the 
author in March 2007 including a questionnaire for 28 Syrian companies (12 
private & 8 public textile companies and 8 olive oil firms); (b) the results of 
interviews conducted in Syria (March 2007) with officials from Ministry of 
Economic & Trade, Ministry of Industry and State Planning Commission, as 
well as with the chairmen and representatives from Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce in Damascus and Aleppo. More details about the survey and the 
interviews may be obtained upon request from the author at said@uni-bremen.de. 
22 Interviews were conducted by the Author with the chairman of the 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Damascus; the chairman of the Chamber 
of Industry in Aleppo in March 2007; the chairman of the Cairo Chamber of 
Industry and the chairman of the Cairo Chamber of Commerce in January 2008. 
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23 Syrian olive oil is exported either in final packaging (e.g. a bottle) under 
the brand of the Syrian company, or in bulk. Packed olive oil in bottles is meant 
to be sold as a final product through retail trade channels. As bulk, the olive oil 
requires refining and/or packaging under the brand of the importing company. 
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